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CHAPTER l 
THE HUMAN PERSON IN THE SOCIAL INSTITUTION 
The individual today stands over against a rapidly changing society. 
Sometimes he has the feeling that he is standing alone or that in some way 
he is rapidly getting out beyond his depth. The prospect alarms him. 
Contemplating the sphere of his human autonomy being invaded by the 
encroaching organizational structures of the society in which he lives, and 
his future being shap1d by cultural determinants over which he seems to have 
less and less control, he becomes uneasy and disqui.eted. Less confident than 
formerly in the rapidly expanding limits of his knowledge and the amazingly 
ingenious skills of his advancing te~hnology, he is more inclined at the 
moment to pause and question his human values. In this way man is becoming 
more aware of man; persons, of persons. 
This awareness is apparent in many spheres of man's life--in industrial 
relations, in personnel management, in community planning, in family life, 
and even in international relations. It was apparent, for example, in the 
communications media of the world press after the Czechoslovakian affair of 
1968, as it was with particular reference to industrial, commercial, and 
academic institutions in France and the U.S.A. at the end of the Summer of 
1968. It was already apparent to a marked degree in the documents.of the 
Second Vatican Council. The basic theme in fact of the first of these 
documents, the theme which sets the tone for all the rest, is exactly this: 
the Church's responsibility for upholding the importance, the dignity~ and 
the value of the human person ("Lumen Gentium," referred to below as LG, 41). 
-1-
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In view of this new awareness of the dignity of man and particularly in view 
of the importance attached to the subject by the documents of Vatican II, this 
concept of the human person merits further investigation. This is the purpose 
of ·the study being undertaken. 
Before pursuing the investigation, however, it is important, from the 
point of view of this study, not to consider the human person alone, but to 
place him in the socj.al or institutional context within which he lives. In 
other words, it is important to develop some satisfactory conceptual framework 
against which the whole study can be projected. One such.framework is that 
developed by Getzels and Guba at the University of Chicago (Getzels, Lipham, 
Campbell, 1968, p. 105). Based on the broader social theory of Talcott 
Parsons at Harvard, this framework serves admirably for placing the human 
person in the role he plays within the institution and then projecting that 
role against the broader cultural backgrounds of the institution on the one 
hand and of the individual on the other. For the particular purpose of the 
study at hand, however, a simpler, more precise framework seems preferable. 
This can be developed from.a few brief assumptions on the nature of man 
and his need for others. If it be assumed, first, that the human person is 
by nature social, that is, needs to relate to others--parents, wife, family, 
colleagues (professional, religious, political, recreational, cultural, and 
so .?n); secondly that he needs these for the full development of. his poten-
tialities, for his own fulfillment; and thirdly, as these two assumptions 
imply, that the sort of relationship envisaged here is a natural institution, 
and not something artificial or man-made; then, on ·the basis of these 
assumptions, it can be argued that the role of the organizational or 
-3-
administrative structure of the institutions in which man lives is primarily 
, . 
to maintain this right relationship; that is, to maintain it in such a way 
that the natural ends of the person and the institution are best achieved. 
These three· entities·--the person,· the institution or community (as we 
shall tend to call it), and the administration--are thus intimately related 
to each other. 
From figure 1 it is to be noted (from the double arrows) that there is 
a mutual interd_ependence between the person and the community, and that this 
relationship is different in character (indicated by the broken lines) from 
that which exists between either the person or the community and the 
. -
administration. From figure 1 it is also apparent that among these three 
~ 
entities there will be raised sooner or later a question of priority; is 
the person for the community, or vice versa? Or are both subordinate to 
the administration? Posed this way, the question would appear to be 
debatable. The answers given vary from place to place, from institution to 
institution, depending on the philosophy or ideology of the institution or 
organization concerned. Ultimately, it is a question of values •. According 
to the Vatican documents, it is the person that enjoys the priority. "For 
the beginning, the subject, and the goal of all social institutions," claims 
The Churc~ in the Modern World, "is and must be the human person, which for 
its part and by its very nature stands completely in need of the social life" 
(i.e., the community) (''Gaudium et Spes," referred to below as GS, 25}. This 
claim does not originate from the document; it is lifed directly from 
St. Thomas Aquinas. who in turn lifted it from Aristotle. The principle, in 
other words, goes back at least to the classical age of Greece; the 
FIGURE 1 
------> <----
·~ ADMINISTRATION ~ 
[PERSON(S)] 
CO~ITY 
Figure 1: Relationship between person, community . 
and administration. 
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significant and, as the document would imply, timely emphasis given it here 
belongs very much to the present. 
In re--affirming it today the Church is not initiating something new. As 
the Council says, she is merely "scrutinizing the signs of the times" (GS,4), 
recognizing and understanding the world in which we live, "its expectations, 
its longings" (GS,4). In the 1940s Pope Pius XII, with his finger sensitively 
on the pulse of society, saw modern man feeling within himself "a new 
awareness of his own personality, of his duties, of his rights" ... and a 
"respect for the freedom of others (Christmas Discourse, :1945; Abbott, 1966, 
p. 677). In the years immediately before the Council John XXIII was empha-
sizing the same awareness (cf. "Pacem in Terris," 11 April 1963, AAS 55, 
p. 684). The documents of the Council spell it .out in explicit terms. "A 
sense of the dignity of the human person," says the decree on Religious 
f_reedom, "has been imposing itself more deeply on the consciousness of 
contemporary man ("Dignitatis Humanae," referred to below as DH, 1). As a 
result, "modern man," in the words of The Church in the Modern World, finds 
himself "on the road to a more thorough development of his own personality, 
and to a growing discovery and vindication of his own rights" (GS, 41). 
Much of this renewed interest in the dignity of the human person pre-
dates the Vatican Council by a good number of years. A great deal of it is 
discernible in the more personalist-oriented philosophers: Kierkegaard, the 
Dane (1813-1855); the Germans, Husserl (1859-1938) (Spiegelberg, 1960) and 
Martin Heidegger (1889) (cf. Brock, 1949); and the French, Henri Bergson 
(1859-1941) (Lindsay, 1911), Gabriel Marcel (_1889--- ) , and Paul Ricoeur; and 
especially in the Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber (1878-1965). whose_! and 
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Thou, appearing in 1923, and its subsequent elaboration in Between Man and Man 
have exerted wide influence in fields outside of philosophy (Friedman, 1960). 
The influence of Husserl's though is also discernible in the writings of 
man others--in the philosophers, Max Scheler, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty; and in the existential psychologists, Ludwig Binswanger and 
F. Buytendijk. 
Significant among American thinkers are the social philosopher Geor&e 
Herbert Mean and tho.se whom he influenced at the University of Chicago. 
Among the psychologists was Otto Rank, one of Freud's Viennese disciples,.who 
settled in America and worked with Jessie Taft at Philadelphia. Thanks to 
Rank and Alfred Adler, another of Freud's early students, the social or 
interpersonal dimensions missing in Freud's work were sketched in to the 
developing psychology of the person. Taken further and given a more 
practical application in the therapy of Harry Stack Sullivan (cf. Sullivan, 
1947), this personalist orientation to therapy and the psychology of the 
person comes into its own in the personological writings of Karen Horney 
(cf. Horney, l950}, Erich Fromm 0.964, 1968), and E. H. Erikson; and in the 
thinking and practice of contemporaries l~ke A. W. Combs (Snygg and Combs, 
1959), A.H. Maslow (1954), Sidney Jourard (1958}, and Carl Rogers (1959). 
In the fields of administration and personnel management the same 
trends are discernible; The personalist orientation is to be strongly noted 
in the thinking of writers like Chris Argyris (1957, 1962), D. McGregor 
(1960), Warren G. Bennis (1962), and in the training procedures developed by 
the National Training Laboratories (1964). Simila~ preoccupations 'are 
apparent in education--at the administration level in the research papers of 
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Andrew Halpin and Don Croft (1963); and at the actual teaching, pupil-care, 
and teacher-education levels, in a whole diversity of theorists and 
practitioners. (Miles, 1967). 
But this new awakening is not entirely extraneous to the Church. It is 
due, according to the Council, to something going on inside the Church as 
well, to the "ferment of the Gospel," which, as the documents claim, "continue 
to arouse in man's heart the irresistible requirements of his dignity" 
(GS, 12, 26, 60). Whatever the source, the Church's special task, according 
to the document's, is to "open up to man the meaning of hi_s own existence .•. 
the innermost truth about himself" (GS, 41); to continue to interpret, "in 
t~e light of the gospel" all;d "in language intelligible to each generation" 
(GS, 41), what each generation is discovering. She does this in numerous 
places but nowhere more emphatically than in The Church in the Modern World, 
the whole first chapter of which is devoted to "dignity of the human person" 
(GS, 12). 
CHAPTER 2 
. 
THE INTEGRAL PERFECTION OF THE HUMAN PERSON: A BRIEF SURVEY 
The preceding chapter dealt with some of the key propositions of the 
Vatican Council on the dignity of the human person. Citations from the 
conciliar documents drew attention to the new awareness in society at large 
of the significance of the human person. They also re-iterated the Council's 
own emphatic underscoring of the same awareness. Numerous references to 
J 
"dignity of the human person" (GS, 12, 41), his "inviolable rights" (DH, 1), 
his priority in society (GS, 25), and so on, say a great~deal about the 
importance of the human person, but they say little about the human person 
himself. When, therefore, ~Church in the Modern World speaks of the 
"integral perfection of the human person" (GS, 59), several pertinent 
questions immediately spring to mind. First, what is to be understood by the 
term "human person" in general? Secondly, in particular and especially for 
the purpose of this essay, what is to be understood by his "integral 
perfection?" What composes it? What are the signs or attributes by which it 
can be recognized? Or the conditions under which it can be attained? 
The answers to these questions are difficult to find. The documents 
offer no definition of the human person, neither do they advance ~ny 
personological theory. Nor is this a lack. Just as the Church has been able 
to accommodate itself to diverse philosophies, so it can accommodate itself 
to diverse personologies. On this account it is not necessary, or is it 
possible, to go searching the documents for any neatly worked out theory. It 
is sufficient for our purposes to take up the second of the above questions 
-9- . 
and try to arrive at some idea of the "integral perfection" of the human 
person as conceived by the Vatican Council. In this' chapter, therefore, it 
is proposed to make a rapid, somewhat cursory survey of the Council documents 
in order to arrive at an ov~r-all picture or model (cf. Arnold, in Arnold 
and Gasson, 1954, p. 8) of the "integral perfection" of the human person. An 
outline of the principal characteristics can be sketched in here. Each of 
these characteristics can be elaborated in subsequent chapters (see Chapters 
.J 
3-7). 
The first of these is the attribute or characteristic of freedom. The 
documents speak at length about "the human person with his freedom," and 
advance the propositions that "only in freedom can man direct himself 
• 
towards goodness" (GS, 17); only through freedom-can he attain his true 
dignity ("Apostolicam Actuosi tat em," re-ferred to below as AA, 8; and also 
John XXIII, "Mater et Magistra" in AAS 53 (1961), pp. 440-3). This freedom, 
moreover, extends to each aspect of his life--his "search for truth," his 
right to "voice his mind," even to "publicize it" (GS, 59).. 
A second dimension of our model is that of responsibility. Between it 
and freedom, there exists a positive linear correlation (DH, 1). The more 
the one is increased, the more the other is incurred (DH, 1). "Mah has an 
inalienable responsibility for his own decisions and actions;" which 
. , 
responsibility, says an editorial note to the Abbott edition of the Conciliar 
documents, is "an essential counterpart of his freedom'' (Abbott, 1966, p. 679). 
A third element of the proposed outline, and one which in a sense 
follows from the first two, is the competency with·'which a human person relate~ 
to others·. A social being by nature, the human person, according to. 
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~ Church in the Modern World, cannot approach the perfection of his being 
unless he has already developed some competence in his interpersonal 
relationships (GS, 12). The interpersonal competence envisaged here, however, 
is only an index to, or manifestation of, something far deeper and far more 
significant--the disposition to give onself to the service of others (GS, 24). 
Almost a result of the human person's greater freedom, sense of 
responsibility; and interpersonal skills is his greater human productivity, 
J 
his greater efficiency in performance (GS, 35). A measure of the degree of 
perfection he has achieved as a "homo faber," this greater productivity is 
in many instances, according to The Church in the Modern World; also an 
index of his greater performance as an integral human person (GS, 35) • 
• 
The fifth and final factor in this model of. the "integral perfection of 
the human person" is what has been termed fulfillment. Given the due 
operation of the other four factors, this fulfillment normally follows 
automatically. In the case of the human person, however, it is different 
from the satisfaction experienced by the brute. In the latter, satisfaction 
follows automatically; in the former, it also follows automatically but only 
upon the proper exercise of the human person's responsibility in the pursuit 
of his final goal. The human person, Pope Paul VI points out in one of his 
post-conciliar encyclicals ("Progressio Populorum," referred to below as 
PP, 15), "endowed with intelligence and freedom," is "responsible for his 
fulfillment as he is for his salvation." The degree of fulfillment, moreover, 
is a sufficiently reliable index to the integrity he has achieved as a 
person. 
Arranged in tabular form (see Table 1), these five attributes. along 
~-· ------------------------------------------------. 
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TABLE 1 
. 
MODEL OF THE "INTEGRAL PERFECTION OF THE HUMAN PERSON" ACCORDING 
CHARACTERISTIC 
FREEDOM 
RESPONSIBILITY 
INVOLVEMENT 
COMMITMENT 
RELATIONS WITH 
OTHERS 
(INTERPERSONAL 
COMPETENCE) 
EFFICIENCY AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 
TO THE DOCUMENTS OF THE VATICAN COUNCIL II 
ILLUSTRATIVE REFERENCES ~ 
Gaudium et Spes 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 24, 29, 41, 59 
Apostolicam Actuositatem 8, 12 
Dignitate Humanae 1, 2, 7 
Inter Mirifica 8 
Unitas Redintegratio 4 
Dignitate Humanae 1, 2, 8, 14 
Perfectae Caritatis 1, 8, 14 
Gaudium et Spes 4, 13, 31 
Gaudium et Spes 6, 12, 14, 24, 25, 26, 38 
Apostolicam Actuositatem 3, 4, 8, 14, 17, 30 
Perfectae Caritatis 14 
Presbyterorum Or~inis 3 
Optatam Totius 11, 19 
Gaudium et Spes 10, 17, 33-39, 64, 84 
Perfectae Caritatis 1, 3, 7, 14 
Optatam Totius 11 
CHARACTERISTIC 
FULFILLMENT 
-.12-
TABLE 1--CONTINUED 
ILLUSTRATIVE REFERENCES 
Lumen Gentium 46 
Gaudium et Spes 9, 13, 14, 15, 35, 75 
Perfectae Caritatis 13, 18 
Paul VI, Encyclical on the Development of Peoples 15 
.! 
Dignitate Humanae 2 
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with illustrative references set out in the right-hand column, provide a 
workable pattern of the human person in the light of the documents of Vactican 
II. Each of these attributes is developed further in the chapters below. 
In view of the fact that the council, in putting forward these propos-
itions on the "integral perfection" of the human person, claims to have been 
"scrutinizing the signs of the times" (GS, 4), it would be relevant, before 
rounding off this chapter~ to investigate briefly what relationship there is 
between these propositions and the views of contemporary social scientists in 
this country. 
Before launching into a comparative study of this sort, however, it is 
necessary to make an important distinction.~ This is the distinction between 
person and personality. It is to be noted that, whereas the documents speak 
generally of the person, some of the scientists in question tend to sp~ak of 
personality. Strictly speaking, these two terms, person and personality, are 
not interchangeable. Personality, as Gasson conceives it in Arnold and 
Gasson's The Human Person (1954, p. 219), is "the patterned totality of 
powers, activities, and habits, uniquely organized by the person;" or as he 
points out elsewhere, the "distinctive configuration ••• of activities which is 
proper to and characteristic of the individual" (p. 168). This pattern of 
behavior, however, implies an agent who acts. This agent is the person. 
Personality, in other words, is not the person; it is what the person makes 
of himself. As Gasson summarizes it, personality is "the work of the person" 
(p. 168). From this it is clear that the conciliar documents are not talking 
generally about personality; they are talking about person. Neither is their 
use of the term "the integral perfection of the human person" referring 
-14-
exactly to the uniquely organized qualities or characteristics that distinguish 
one personality from another. They are referring rather to the basic elements 
which constitute the conditions necessary for the proper development of the 
person. Viewed this way, the term personality, as used by the contempora~y 
scientists cited above, refers more to the typical ways in which these 
conditions are utilized by the person concerned. A few illustrations will 
make this clear. David Riesman (1950) writes of the "autono_mous person;" 
Abraham Maslow, borrowing from Kurt Goldstein (1939, 1940), speaks of the "self'" 
actualizing" person (19 54, p. 199); Carl Rogers, of the "fully-functioning 
person".(1959, p. 234); while Paul Goodman speaks of the "independent 
_personality" (19651; Erich Fromm, of the "productive personality" (1941); and 
Snygg and Combs, of the "adequate personality" (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 237). 
As has been shown, these differences in expression represent different ways 
of conceiving how the person utilizes the requisite conditions in developing 
his peculiar personality. The extent to which they relate to the conciliar 
notion of the "integral perfection" of the human person will be seen from a 
comparison with the views set out below. 
For this comparison the views of four American psychologists have been 
selected. The first two, Donald Snygg and Arthur Combs, represent the 
American phenomenological viewpoint (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 11; Ford and 
Urban, 1963, p. 475). Despite a perceptible shift in thinking between the 
first edition of their work in 1949 and the second, revised edition a decade 
later, a number of their propositions still remain challengeable. Their 
influence on American psychological thinking, moreover, has been less than 
that of the other two. 
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The third psychologist, Abraham Maslow, is one of the b~tter known 
protagonists of what is known in this country as humanistic psychology (Maslow, 
1954, pp. 2-3). 
The fourth psychologist selected for this study is Carl Rogers. Generally 
regarded as the founder of client·-centered_ therapy, Rogers sets out his theory 
of the "fully functioning" in a number of propositions (Rogers, 1959) based 
largely on his experience in therapy. A number of these propositions, 
especially those dealing with his assumptions on the innate regulatory 
principle of man's "organismic valuing process" and the resulting "healthy, 
integrated" behavior, are widely questioned. Rogers, qevertheless, has gen-
erated a great deal of research in support of his views (cf. Rogers, 1959); 
in additon, he has exerted a great deal of influence generally in the related 
fields of personality theory and psychotherapy in this country (Ford and Urban, 
1963, p. 4441. 
These psychologists have been selected, not because they concur with the 
views expressed by the conciliar documents, but because they are representative 
of a rather large segment of psychological opinion in this country. To a 
degree the documents, in dealing with the human person, cover the same ground 
as the psychologists, but in many instances they go much further. In some 
respects the documents and the psychologists concur; "in others they do not. 
These differences will be apparent in the succeeding chapters and even iri 
the brief comparison that follows. 
With the introduction, the above sketch of the human person can be 
considered item by item. Beginning with the item of freedom, for instance, 
it will be observed that the documents assume free will; some of the 
-16-
psychologists in question (cf. Snygg and Combs, 1949, p. 24 n.) * do not. 
The issue here, however, is not whether man has free will but how mu~h of 
that freedom a person actually enjoys, given his particular personality and 
the circumstances in which he finds himself on the instant (cf. Arnold, 1954, 
PP· 9, 10). With this distinction in mind (DH,2) and considering freedom in 
the latter sense, it will be noted that where the Vatican II documents speak 
of freedom (on, say, the intra-personal level), Maslow would speak of 
"autonomy," "detachment," "simplicity" (in the serise of "not easily threat-
ened"), and "resistance to enculturation" (Maslow, 1954, pp. 144-'-5, 224-228). 
Snygg and Combs would use words like the "autonomous" person or the person 
who takes a "more positive (in the sense of .realistic) view of self" (1959, . 
p. 240), and the "non-threatened personalities" (pp. 178-89). Carl Rogers 
is more likely to express himself in words like "being open to one's 
experience (in the sense of not resorting to defenses), and "experience being 
available to. awareness" (1959, p. 234) in the sense of the person being aware 
of the deeper emotions or motivations that might impede or in some way 
distort the exercise of his freedom. 
The concept of responsibility and the related concepts of involvement 
and commitment appearing in the conciliar documents are rendered in a much 
~hallower and almost different way in Snygg and Combs' writings by words 
like "identification" (Le., with a cause) (1959, pp. 245, 263, 270); in 
Maslow ts 1 by "problem-centering" (i.e., commitment to something outside the 
person) (Maslow, 1954, p. 211); in Rogers' works by terms like "balanced 
*In the revised edition of their work (1959, p. 17} the authors seem 
to have modified their ori inal view. 
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and realistic" (1961, p. 194), "using the self as the locus of evaluation" 
(1959, p. 234), accepting the self as a "trustworthy instrument" (1961, p. 195), 
and the like. 
The concept of interp~rsonal relations, emphasized by the work of Harry 
Stack Sullivan (1953), is well understood by American psychologists in 
general. For this concept Snygg and Combs use terms like "acceptance of others' 
(1959, p. 137) and "compassion," Maslow uses similar terms--"acceptance of 
self and others" (1954, p. 206), "democratic structure" (p. 219),. 
"Gemeinschaftsgefuhl" (p. 217), and simply ninterpersonal relations" (p. 218). 
For the same concept Rogers uses terms like living ''with others in maximum 
harmony" (Rogers, 1959, p. 235). In the Vat~can II concept, of course, 
there are other, theological, connotations leading to considerations of 
' . 
Christian charity which are beyond the scope of this essay. 
The notion of greater efficiency and productivity Maslow would see 
partly as a consequence of better "discrimination" between "means and ends" 
(1954, p. 220), a "more efficient perception of reality" (p. 257), or simply 
being "cognitively" efficient (p. 204}. Rogers would conceive it as "each 
situation" being met "with a unique and creative adaptation" (Rog_ers, 1959, 
p. 235), while Snygg and Combs would employ the straightforward expression, 
behaving "more effectively and efficiently" (Snygg and Combs, 1959, P• 250), 
referring thereby to the effectiveness of the work performed as well as to 
the efficiency of the performer. 
The last factor, fulfillment, is conceived by the psychologists as a 
sense of well-being or satisfaction, appropriatness or rightness of fit 
which pervades the organism when its response has been the natural, appropriat« 
,,.. 
I .... ----------------_,,._._. __ ,_., ______________________ .,_,_. __ .._.__......,..,,,,__.....,.....,,,.... ...... _,....,...,_...,.. __ ~ 
-18-
response and tension is at a minimum. To describe this condition Syngg and 
combs as well as Maslow use the term "spontaneity" (Snygg and Combs, 1959, 
', 
P· 252). Rogers is expressing the same phenomenon when he talks of the 
"self-structure" as being "congruent with experience" but would go further 
~ 
and describe the person living at this level as experiencing a "more 
sensitive living, with greater range, greater variety, greater richness" 
(Rogers, 1961, p. 189). Maslow speaks in much the same way but extends this 
_.;-
dimension to include the rarer but tremendously more fulfilling experiences 
that he calls "peak" or "mystic experiences" (Maslow, 1954, p. 216). Where 
the conciliar concept goes beyond this will be seen i~ Chapter 7. 
Summarizing this psychologists' picturG of the human person and 
comparing it with that of the Vatican documents, we get a composite picture 
like that set out in Table 2. Along the horizontal axis are the character-
istics of the human person as envisaged by the Vatican documents; along the 
vertical axis, the corresponding characteristics as described by the four 
psychologists considered above. 
TABLE 2 
MODEL OF THE "INTEGRAL PERFECTION" OF THE HUMAN PERSON ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENTS OF 
VATICAN II AND THE WRITINGS OF FOUR CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGISTS 
DOCUMENTS OF 
VATICAN II 
CONTEMPORAR' 
PSYCHOLOGISTS 
"THE ADEQUATE 
PERSONALITY" 
(SNYGG & COMBS) 
"THE SELF-
ACTUALIZING 
PERSON" 
(ABRAHAM MASLOW) 
FREEDOM 
"Autonomous 
''Non-threatened 
Personalities" 
-"Positive View 
·Of Self" 
"Simplicity 
Not Easily 
Threatened" 
"Resistance to 
Enculturation" 
RESPONSIBILITY 
INVOLVEMENT 
COMMITMENT 
"Identification" 
(i.e., with a 
cause) 
"Problem-
Cen tering" 
INTERPERSONAL 
COMPETENCE 
~ 
"Compassion .•• 
Concern for . 
Others" 
"Less Compul-
sion to 
• Prove Oneself" 
"Acceptance of 
Others" 
EFFICIENCY 
AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 
"Behaves More 
Effectively 
and 
Efficiently" 
"Gemeinschafts-,"More Effi-
gefuhl" cient 
Perception 
"Acceptance of of Reality" 
Self and 
Others" "Cognitively 
Efficient 
''More Data 
Available 
I 
I 
I· 
FULFILLMENT 
11Spon taneous 
and Crea-
tive 
Behavior" 
"Freshness 
of Assoc-
iation" 
"Full 
Stature" 
"Mystic 
Experiences 1 
. I 
._,,,,,, 
I 
...... 
\0 
I 
"THE FULLY-
FUNCTIONING 
PERSON" 
(CARL ROGERS) 
FREEDOM 
"Open to 
Experiences" 
(No Defenses)· 
"Symbolizations 
Accurate" 
TABLE 2--CONTINUED 
RESPONSIBILITY 
INVOLVEMENT 
COMMITMENT 
"Balanced and 
Realistic" 
INTERPERSONAL 
COMPETENCE 
"With Others in 
Maximum Harmony'' 
Less Need for 
"Defensive \ 
Behavior" 
EFFICIENCY 
AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 
"Each Situa-
tion Met with 
a Unique 4nd 
Creative 
Adaptation" 
FULFILLMENT 
"Self-
Structure 
Congruent 
with 
Experiencen 
"More Sen-
sitive .•• 
Greater 
Variety ••. 
Greater 
Richness" · 
/ 
I 
N 
0 
I 
.,,,. 
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FREEDOM 
Focusing on the concept of freedom, this chapter will deal with the 
elements of this concept as they are developed in the documents of Vatican 
Council II, and, with the corresponding elements as they are developed in 
the four selected psychologists. Within these two parts it will make the 
further distinction between "freedom from" (items 1-7, Table 3) and "freedom 
to or for" (items 8-11, Table 3). In dealing with the former there will be 
a distinction between the factors.that constrain a person from without 
(items 1-4, Table 3) and those that inhibit him from within (items 5-7, 
Table 3). Of some of these inhibiting forces man is aware; of others he is 
largely unaware. 
As was shown in Chapter 1, the conciliar documents base many of their 
propositions on the "integral perfection of the human person" (GS, 59) on 
man's freedom. A more detailed study of this notion of freedom reveals a 
distinction between what the documents call "freedom from" and "freedom to:" 
freedom from those things that constrain or inhibit the exercise of one's 
freedom (cf. GS, 27, 31), and freedom to do those things that afford one 
opportunities for self-realization and fulfillment (cf. GS, 17, 31, 62); 
Gasson in Arnold and Gasson, 1954, p. 194). The concept of "freedom from" 
is further distinguished into freedom from the inhibiting factors that 
restrict the person from within (cf. GS, 12, 60); and the constraining 
factors that constrict him from without (cf. "Inter Mirifica," referred to 
below as IM, 2, 8; DH, 7, 8; GS, 27). 
The latter are listed in some detail. Speaking broadly, ~ Church in 
the Modern World asserts that "whatever violates the integrity of the human 
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TABLE 3 
FREEDOM--SUMMARIZING THE VATICAN DOCUMENTS AND 
THE CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS 
VATICAN DOCUMENTS 
CONSTRAINTS FROM WITHOUT: 
1. Social, economic, racial, 
religious discrimination. 
2. Public opinion, political 
pressumes. IM 8. 
3. Encroachment of state. 
DH 1. 
4. Cultural determinations. 
DH 7. 
CONSTRAINTS FROM WITHIN: 
5. Socio-psychological factors. 
IM 8, DH 2. 
6. Emotional imbalance. 
GS 10. 
7. Prejudices, anxieties, 
obsessions, guilt. GS 12, 
16, 20, 41, AP ACT 12. 
FREEDOM TO/FOR: 
8. Towards his own goodness. 
GS 17. 
9. Spontaneous choice of the 
good. GS 17. 
10. Motivated from within. 
GS 17. 
11. Freedom in social, personal 
and spiritual affairs. UR 4. 
SNYGG AND COMBS 
"Higher degree of independence of 
social and physical forces" 
"Break loose from many of the petty 
tyrannies of their surroundings" 
"Less need to defend themselves from 
external attack" 
"Break with tradition and orthodoxy" 
"No great need to defend themselves 
against experience" 
"Cope with life openly and directly 
with a minimum of threat and fear" 
"Non-threatened personalities" 
"Positive view of self" 
"Respond more to the inner wellsprings 
of understanding and motivation" 
___ ., 
f•,,. 
-23-
TABLE 3--CONTINUED 
ABRAHAM MASLOW 
,;~ 
l;~~ 
fl.'! 
>Jelative independence of physical and 
~cial environment" 
'.Jlore easily "resist enculturation and 
··• intain a certain inner detachment 
om the culture in which they are 
ersed. 
simplicity that is not easily 
reatened" 
.. "i/ery unneurotic way of reacting 
yes see what is before them without 
... ing strained ••. to distort or shape I" colour the reality" 
··;Live more in the real world ••. than in 
·.,-.. . 
e manmade mass of concepts, abstract-
. ns, expectations, beliefs and stereo-· 
i·. pes that most people confuse with 
real world" 
the fresh, concrete, and 
the generic, abstract, 
CARL ROGERS 
Less "vulnerable •.. threatened ... 
anxious" 
"Open to his experiences ... exhibitin 
no defensiveness" 
"Distorting nothing, denying nothing 
•.. all experiences open to aware-
ness" 
Fewer "conditions of worth" 
More "unconditional self regard" 
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person ... attempts to coerce the will itself" (GS, 27), and then goes on to 
spell out some of the more specific factors it has in mind. Among these 
"infamies" (GS, 26), as it labels them, are included "every ••• type of 
discrimination, social or cultural, whether based on sex, race; colour, social 
condition, or religion" (GS, 29)--on what The Church in the Modern World 
calls "the fundamental," or The Declaration on Religious Freedom "the 
inviolable" (DH, 1), "rights of the human person" (GS, 29). 
Particularizing on some of these constraints, the latter document cites 
society in general as a constraining factor upon the use of man's freedom • 
. "Many pressures," it declares, "are brought to bear upon men of today, 
to the point where the danger arises lest they lose the possibility of 
acting on their own judgment" (DH, 8). The De.c::tee. of Communication draws 
attention to the fact that through contemporary instruments of communication 
"public opinion exerts massive force and authority over the private and 
public life of every class of citizen" (IM, 8). One sphere of life where 
this massive force of public opinion is significant is the political sphere. 
The Church in the Modern World singles this ·sphere out as one where what 
it calls the "national procedures" should allow the "largest possible number 
of citizens to participate in public affairs with genuine freedom" (GS, 31). 
This brings up questions like the abuse of authority. Beginning with 
admonitions against what they term "the encroachments of the State" (DH, 1) 
and other forms of civil government, the documents deal successively with 
similar abuses in ecclesiastical, religious and even family institutions. 
·, Priests, in dealing with the laity, are urged "scrupulously •.• (to) honour ~' .... t_h_a_t __ J_·u_s_t _ f_r __ e_e_d_o_m __ w_h_i_c_h __ i_s __ d_u_e __ t_o __ e_v_e_r_y_o_n_e __ i_n __ t_h_1_·_s __ e_a_r_t_h_1_y __ c_i_t_y_'_' ______________ _. 
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(Presbyterorum Ordinis, II referred to below as PO, 9); while religious 
superiors are exhorted to govern in a way that will cultivate in their 
religious "that enlarged freedom which belongs to the sons of Gotl" ("Perfectae 
Caritatis," referred to below as PC, 14). The same safeguards of personal 
freedom are advocated in the exercise of domestic authority within the 
family (cf. "Apostolicam Actuositatem," referred to below as AA, 11, 12) and, 
indeed, in all other spheres where men relate to one another, whether it be 
on an industrial, commercial, recreational, or more general social basis. 
These relations, declares the decree on the laity, "should not be stained by 
any quest for personal advantage or by any thirst for dominations" (AA, 8). 
Looking to other likely factors which might impose constraints upon man 
in the legitimate use of his freedom, The Church in the Modern World draws 
attention to the harmful effects of great poverty. "Human freedom," it 
claims, "is often crippled when a man falls into extreme poverty, just as it 
withers when he indulges in too many of life's comforts" (GS, 31). The 
Declaration on Religious Freedom sees the possibility of further harmful 
constraints in the culturally determined patterns of our society--prevailing 
fashions, modes of recreation, entertainment, patterns of family life, sexual 
behavior, and the like. "The usages of society," says the document, referring 
to such factors, "are to be the usages of freedom in their full range. These 
require that the freedom of man be respected as far as possible, and curtailed 
only when and in so far as necessary" (DH, 7). 
Determining the limits of this necessity is a matter of extreme 
importance. In fact, this whole question of the "freedom and dignity" of 
the person is one which comes up in almost every document. It is, to sum up 
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in the words of the decree on the laity, a matter "of the utmost delicacy" 
(M, 8). 
Leaving this enumeration of external factors which constrain t~e freedom 
of the human person from without, we can pass on to a consideration of the 
factors operating from within. These are the factors that inhibit the use 
of what the documents describe as man's "psychological freedom" (DH, 2). 
Emphasis on the external or coercive limitations on the exercise of freedom 
has been marked in Roman documents especially since the time of Leo XIII. 
Only in recent years, however, has much recognition been given to the factors 
influencing man from within. Pius XII's referenc~, for instance, to the man 
who "feels .within himself a consciousnes.s oLhis own personality" draws 
attention to these more strictly intra-personal forces in man which in some 
instances drastically curtail his freedom. 
The older moral theology, it is true, contained the classical treatise 
"on the obstacles (impedimenta) to freedom," but as a model to cope with 
the more recent findings of the behavioral sciences it is somewhat inadequate. 
It assumes that man enjoys a perfectly autononous power of decision which is. 
hindered only occasionally, accidentally, and exceptionally by certain 
disturbing factors which operate from within man and largely beyond his 
control (Monden, 1965, pp. 34-40). Quite. different is the picture presented 
by contemporary psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Here the dialectic 
of freedom and determinism is seen, not merely as accidental, but as · 
essential to almost every human act. Some of the determining factors, 
particularly the biological: the opiates, the tranqui1izers, the psychedelics 
the "police drugs," the truth serums, and the more recent discoveries of neuro 
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surgery and endocrinology are well known and from time to time thrust 
themselves dramatically before the public eye. Less well known are the more 
strictly social and psychological factors. 
These need further consideration. Many men, it is claimed, are prevented 
from acting with any great degree of real autonomy. To a large extent they 
are mass products, strongly influenced by what the document on communication, 
quoted above, described as the "massive force and authority" of the prevailing 
opinions and propaganda canvassed by the new instruments of communication 
(IM, 1). More and more, it seems, they tend to react as a mass,.judge as a 
mass, and feel as a mass, without any adequate defense against th, powerful 
·socio-psychological pressures operating within and around them (IM, 8).' Many 
.. 
women, for instance, have not been able to resist the strong influence of 
these socio-psychological pressures on questions like that of birth control, 
nor for that matter have juries sitting on this and related matters. 
Pressures like these, declares the same document, seem "all too easily" 
able to "trigger" forces which remain in man "wounded as he is by original 
sin" (IM, 7) and "split within himself" (GS, 13). 
Equally powerful in curtailing man's freedom has been his emctional 
imbalance (GS, 10) or what The Church in the Modern World describes as the 
lack of "harmony with himself, with others, and with all created things" 
(GS, 13). The deep need, at times scarcely emerging into consciousness, 
for security, love, esteem and other affective relationships on the one 
hand, and the half-recognized aggressiveness, hostility, and competitiveness 
on the other hand; and, above all, what the documents term the nagging 
doubts and uncertainties (GS, 12) about oneself--all these have a decided 
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influence on man's attitudes and actions. Of such inhibitin~ forces man is 
most of the time all too painfully aware. In this respect the documents 
see him as captive (GS, 17). 
More painfully inhibiting still, however, are those forces of which he 
is less clearly aware. They remain deep within his own psyche. Functioning 
at more unconscious levels, these forces, renmants largely of his past, can 
bind him more strongly than the others. Fixated in his mind as a host of 
unassimilated and, to that extent~ paralyzing deformations, these are the 
lurking anxieties (GS, 12), ·the blinding ignorances and prejudices (GS, 16, 
60), the tyrannical automatizations, bondages, and obsessive impulses 
(GS, 41), the debilitating frustrations, uneasy feelings of guilt and other 
equally intimidating fears (GS, 12), which time and time again intrude into 
what should be free, mature, adult decisions, reducing them repeatedly to 
I the level of the immature, the blase, or even the infantile (GS, 4, 60; AA, 
12; cf. Monden, 24-6). 
From this condition the human person has to be constantly rescued. 
Only in so far as he is liberated from tyrannies like these is he capable of 
enjoying the freedom to which his personhood entitles him. For that reason, 
it seems, the conciliar documents are as much concerned with the question of 
"freedom from" as they are with the more .positive question of "freedom to" 
or "freedom for." Only when man is freed from the things that bind him is 
he free to "direct himself towards goodness" (GS, 17). Let us pass on then 
to this new question of "freedom for." In what precisely does it consist 
and how will man use it? Will he use it "perversely," asks The Church in the 
Modern World, after the fashion of certain contemporaries? Or "as a license 
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for doing whatever pleases him, even if it is evil" (GS, 17)? This would 
hardly be the "authentic freedom" which the documents see as an exceptional 
sign of the divine image within man" (GS, 17). The conciliar Fathers are more 
optimistic. Left "in the hand of his own counsel," they say, quoting Sirach 
(15 :14), man "can seek his own Creator spontaneously" (GS, 17). But the 
freedom to choose, which is herein implied, must be present as a condition. 
Human dignity, say the Fathers, "demands that (man) act according to a 
knowing and fre~ choice." And this choice, it·is emphatically pointed out, 
"is personally motivated and prompted from within. It does not result from 
blind internal impulses nor mere external pressure" (GS, 17). 
This spontaneity which, according to the documents, characterizes the 
~ 
"freed" man's behavior will be taken up again subsequently in the chapter on 
'-fulfillment (cf. Chapter 7). For the moment it is important to return to 
the question of how man uses this freedom. 
The documents conceive this use in terms of means and ends. Liberated 
from the constraints and limitations that once bound him, man now "pursues 
his goal," according to The Church in the Modern World, "in a spontaneous 
choice of what is good, and procures for himself, through effective and 
skilful action, apt means and end" (GS, 17}. 
The means are diverse. First, rilan is to use his freedom, not as an 
escape from the demands of society, but as a means rather of integrating 
with and better adjusting to it. "Freedom," says one of the documents, 
"acquires new strength ••. when a man consents to the unavoidable requirements 
of social life" (GS, 31). Secondly, man is to enjoy freedom of inquiry, 
thought, and expression. "Within the limits of morality, and the general 
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welfare," says The Church in the Modern World, "man is free to search for 
truth, voice his mind, and publicize it" (GS, 59r. In a later paragraph the· 
document affirms this same freedom to the scholar in the Church. "Let it be 
recognized that all the f~ithful, clerical and lay, possess a lawful freedom 
of inquiry and of thought, and the freedom to express their minds humbly 
and courageously about those matters in which they enjoy competence" (GS, 
62). Thirdly, man's freedom extends even into the realms of spirituality, 
liturgical worship, and theological speculatio~. "While preserving unity in 
essentials," says the document on ecumenism, "let all the members of the 
Church, according to the office entrusted to each, preserve a proper freedom 
·in the various forms of spiritual life and discipline, in the variety of 
liturgical rites, and even in theological elaborations of revealed truth" 
("Unitatis Redintegratio," referred to below as UR, 4). 
Daring in its liberality, as it may appear to some, this third point 
goes no further than the pre-conciliar reconnnendations of Pope John XXIII 
and Cardinal Bea. It merely spells out some of t~e more specific applications 
implicit in the principles already laid down. Though mainly theological in 
their orientation or point of view, these principles find corroboration in 
the more psychologically oriented principles of the contemporary ·American.· 
psychologists to whom reference has already been made and to whose works it 
might be relevant at this moment to turn. 
Taking first the writings of Snygg and Combs, it may be useful to 
recall their earlier position (1949, p. 24n.1 on free will (supra, 
Chapter 2).. Although this. positi.on has been subsequently modified (1959, 
p. 17), the gap between tfJ.eir basic assumptions and those of the Vatican 
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documents is still obvious. Even so, several relevant parallels are to 
be noted. 
The first is the question of freedom from constraints which come from 
outside the person. On this the authors assert that "adequate" personalities, 
as they describe those acting at this level, feel in no way deprived, and on 
that account have "far less need to defend themselves from external attack" 
(Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 243). Neither do they have "great need to defend 
themselves agait).st their experience" (p. 243). , As a result they are seen as 
being able to "break loose from many of the petty tyrannies of their surround-
ings," thereby achieving a certain "autonomy" which, the authors claim, 
appears to be a "direct outgrowth of the indi~vidual' s openness to experience 
and trust in self" (p. 254). This sort of freedom manifests itself in 
diverse ways. It is observed, for example, in the "higher degree of 
independence of social and physical forces which," according to Snygg and 
Combs, "bind many of the rest of us" (p. 254). It is observed also in the 
basic security and courage which enable people who enjoy greater liberty to 
"break with" what the documents (e.g., PC, 3) term the outmoded customs and 
regulations that over the years have come to be taken for tradition or 
orthodoxy (cf. Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 253). 
With reference more particularly to freedom from within, the same 
people are viewed as seeing themselves in "essentially positive ways.n In 
this way they are "free and open to their experience." Such people apparently 
feel "strong and safe enough to cope with life openly and directly with a 
minimum of threat and fear" (p. 239). They view the world in which they 
live as exciting and challenging, yet well within their own capacities to 
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deal with. On that account, claim the authors, they might almost equally 
well be described as "nonthreatened personalities" (p. 240). 
Freed thus from the things that threaten them and finding themselves 
less in the grip of extern.al events and things beyond their control, these 
people seem able to "respond more" to what Snygg and Combs would describe as 
"the inner wellsprings of understanding and motivation" (p. 254; cf. 
promptings of Holy Spirit, LG, 15; GS, 92; "Optatam Totius," referred to 
below as OT, 3).. 
Maslow's concept of freedom in the "self-actualizing" person is almost 
parallel. Referring to constraints upon the person from without, Maslow 
shows how the person enjoying this sort of ~reedom maintains his freedom 
even when dealing with or acting as an authority figure. The specific 
paradigm he uses is the teacher-student relationship. Teachers of this type, 
he maintains, behave in a "very unneurotic 1! way." Instead of viewing the 
classroom situation as a "clash of wills, or authority, of dignity, etc." 
they view it as a "pleasant collaboration" (Maslow, 1954, p. 231). The 
win-lose" model just does not apply. In this way, Maslow claims, "the 
artificial dignity that is easily threatened" is replaced by "the natural 
simplicity that is not easily threatened." 
Similarly in regard to freedom from the demands of the environment, 
culture and society at large: a characteristic of people enjoying this sort 
of freedom, Maslow claims, is their "relative independence of the physical 
and social environment" (p. 213}_. The same holds true in regard to the 
·' 
somewhat more interiorized cultural patterns: these people, observes Maslow, 
more easily "resist enculturation and maintain a certain inner detachment 
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from the culture in which they are immersed" (p. 224). 
Freer from environmental and cultural determinations on the outside, 
these people are also freer on the inside. Maslow observes this in the 
greater reliability of thefr perception. The limiting or distorting effects 
of "wish, desire, and prejudice,"" he avers, are very much less marked in the 
person who has achieved this sort of freedom (p. 205). In the samples he 
investigated self-actualizing people distinguished "far more easily than 
most the fresh, concrete, and idiographic from.the generic, abstract, and 
rubricized." As a result they live "more in the real world of nature than 
in the man-made mass of concepts, abstractions, expectations, beliefs and 
stereotypes that most people confuse with the real world" (p. 205). The 
same reality factor distinguishes the character£stic way they experience 
guilt. Unlike those psychologists who would regard all guilt as pathological, 
Maslow does not claim that in his subjects there is an "absolute" absence 
of guilt--of shame, sadness, anxiety, defensiveness-~but merely an absence 
of what he calls "unnecessary (because unrealistic) guilt." The animal 
processes of sex, urination, pregnancy, menstruation, growing old, and 
the like, are seen, he claims, as "part of reality and so must be accepted." 
No healthy woman then need feel constrained in her freedom or inhibited 
through having to feel guilt about '~eing female or about any of the female 
processes" (p. 208)_. As a consequence many of the so-called problems of 
conscience and morals are seen not to be problems at all: they are unreal 
ones and exist only in the minds of the narrow, rigid, unfree persons -who 
~---­
create them; when seen di ff erently--and more real is tically--~!\Jd:ilsapp~a.r ""-... \. 
: " ' ~ \ (p. 230). l l 
\ 
\. 
{ 
I 
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This concept of freedom is presented in similar terms in the Rogerian 
description of the "fully-functioning" person. The person who is not 
functioning fully is the one who is not yet sufficiently free and as a 
' 
consequence, according to Rogers,. "denies to awareness or distorts in 
awareness significant experiences" (Rogers, 1959, p. 204). Such a person 
is said to be "vulnerable" or "threatened" or "anxious," according to the 
point of view from which he is considered--from the outside or from his 
own inside point of view. The well adjusted person, on the other hand, the 
person enjoying proper freedom, will be--to use Rogerian terms--"open to his 
experiences," exhibiting "no defensiveness," distorting nothing, denying 
nothing; and, as a consequence, making "all experiences available to 
awareness" (p. 2341. 
A person who has attained this degree of freedom, Rogers claims, will be 
less susceptible to the influence of his environment, less dependent upon 
the judgment of others. Instead he will "experience himself as the law of 
evaluation" (p. 2341. In thi.s way, as he tends to become more immune to 
the approval or disapproval of others, to impose upon himself, in Rogerian 
language, fewer "conditions of worth" (p. 235), and to function ~nstead from 
an interior motivation or experience more "unconditional self-regard." 
It is clear that the psychologists in question have addressed themselves 
mainly to the intrapersonal factors limiting freedom. This is so for several 
reasons. With the exception of Maslow there is a tendency to general~ze from 
data drawn largely from pathological cases. In some instances, too, the human 
person seems to have been credited with few degrees of freedom above the 
rest of the organic world (cf.· Gasson, 1954, p. 167); or, as Arnold says, it 
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is too readily assumed that what the human person does is de~ermined by his 
"temperament, upbringing, environment, and cultural milieu." Given that this 
is true in part, it is also true, Arnold adds, that the person has "aims and 
purposes" that rise aoove this, that "he thinks, that he can make deductions, 
can reason" and, as a consequence, "can decide for or against any given 
action" (Arnold, 1954, p. 9}. On these accounts it is not surprising to find 
in the psychologists' treatment of freedom certain limitations not found in 
the conciliar tTeatment. These limitations not withstanding, the psychol-
ogists' treatment is relevant. 
CHAPTER 4 
RESPONSIBILlTY~-A BALANCED VIEW 
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An immediate consequence of the freedom advocated for man in the 
preceding chapter is his responsibility. A person can be responsible only 
inasmuch as he is free. Between freedom and responsibility, in other words, 
there is a direct proportion. This can be expressed in many ways: a person 
can be responsible only inasmuch as he is free; or, increase a person's 
freedom and you thereby increase his responsibility. The one follows from 
and is coterminous with the other. "Man," says an editoral note in the 
Abbott editon of the documents of Vatican II, "has an inalienable responsibil..-
ity for his own decisions and actions which'i.s the essential counterpart 
of his freedom" (Abbott, p. 679 n.}. This doct.rine is not new, hut appears, 
from the increasing numbers of references to it in recent papal writings--
of Pius XI (cf. "Mit Brennender Sorge, 11 19371, -for example, Pius XII and 
John XXIIl (cf. "Pacem in Terris, 11 19631-.,.to have assumed an altogether 
new significance. That significance would seem to be on the order of a new 
phenomenological awareness of what it means to be a person. The Declaration 
on Religious Freedom catches this a little when it speaks of this sort of 
responsibility as being associated with the dignity of personhood. "Beings 
endowed with reason and free will, 11 it claims, 11 are privileged to bear 
personal responsibility" (Dil, 2}. In other words, as this document sees lt, 
responsibility follows from the fact of freedom. 
The argument is much the same as it was in presenting the case for 
freedom. In dealing with the human person's right to freedom the documents 
begin by considering first the constraints that hamper man in the exercise 
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of his freedom and then pass on to the more positive aspect of what man's 
freedom is for and what the exercise of it is to being him. Similarly in 
dealing with the human person's responsibility, the documents begin by 
considering the obstacles to the exercise of responsibility and then go on 
to consider what this exericse means to man. 
The "demand is increasingly made," says the Declaration on Religious 
Freedomm that men should make full use of their "responsib~e freedom," 
acting On "their OWU judgment, II and being motivated from Within and 11nOt 
driven by coercion" (DH, 1). The Church in the Modern World and·particularly 
the post-conciliar documents (cf. Paul VI's Progress of the Peoples, 1967, 
n. 9) draw attention to the fact that some are "deprived of the opportunity 
to exercise responsibility;" others cannot exercise it because they are 
"culturally poor" (GS, 57}. For that reason the conciliar document claims 
that for the discharge of their responsibilities with "greater exactness" 
people must be "carefully educated to a higher degree." For this purpose, 
argues the document, · 11innnense resources are available." 
"Children and young people," it is !!!tressed, ''have a right to be 
encouraged" to make "personal choices" (GS, 17} in order thereby to 
\ 
experienc~ a sense of responsibility. Educators are urged to "form men ••• 
who will come to decisions with their own judgment and ••• govern their 
activities with a sense of responsibility" (DH, 8}. 
A part of this general sense of responsibility is the more specific 
sense of one's responsibility to ~thers and the consequent needs for 
'~fulfilling one's duties in community life" and "joining with others in 
I . 
co-operative. effort" (DH, 81. The Decree on the Renewal Ef. the. Religio~s 
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Life makes a big thing of this responsibility in religious. "They (religious) 
all have contributions to make." "Some exercise a ministry of service," 
says the decree, quoting St. Paul to the Romans (12 : 5-8) and to the 
Corinthians (I Car. 12 4}; "some teach doctrine, some encourage through 
exhortation, some give in simplicity, or bring cheerfulness to the sorrowful" 
(PC, 8)_. But all have a responsibility and all should be afforded the 
opportunity to exercise it by being listened to ''willingly" and "encouraged 
to make a personal contribution" (PC, 14). 
Associated with this notion of responsibility are the related 
phenomena of involvement and commitment. The decree on Renewal would see 
religious with such a strong sense of respon~ibility that they become 
completely involved, "spending themselves incre~singly for Christ" (Le., 
for His corporate body, the Church--cf Col. 1 : 241, and going all the way 
to sacrifice "through a surrender involving their entire lives" (PC, 1). In 
this way not only does the individual religious grow in authentic adult 
commitment, but the Church, the congregation to which he belongs also stand 
to benefit (GS, 64; cf. Monden, 28}. 
This sort of responsibility, this sort of commitment, can also benefit 
society at large. It can reveal to other men a meaning for their own 
existence (GS, 41. Religious, when discharging their responsibility and 
displaying the degree of commitment envisaged here, are viewed by the docu.,... 
ments as the witnesses needed in the world today--responsible enough, committe< 
enough, strong enough "to provide coming generations with reasons for living 
"--
and hoping." In that sense the "future of humanity" is seen as lying in 
their hands (GS, 31)_. 
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The view expressed above in the conciliar documents--that the responsi-
bility exercised by the human person is directly proportional to the freedom 
he enjoys--is also shared by the psychologists being considered in this essay. 
Snygg and Combs, revi~wing this question, draw attention to two widely 
held views. The first and earlier view is that man is completely responsible, 
entirely and independently of anything outside of him. The second view is 
the opposite: that man is not responsible but that he is completely the 
victim of his e~vironment (Snygg and Combs, 1959, p. 309), almost a physical 
object whose behavior is <let.ermined by forces acting upon him. Between these 
two extremes Snygg and Combs, in their later work (1959, p. 310; cf. 1954, 
p. 24 n. and Chapter 2 above}, choose the middle position. In this respect 
they approach the position taken by the Vatican-documents, namely, that the 
human person is neither so completely responsible as the first view suggests 
nor so inevitably and irrevocably at the mercy of his environment or the 
forces within him as the second view claims he is. They see man as in part 
controlling and in part controlled (p. 310). The more effectively he can 
be set free from the forces that encroach upon the exercise of his freedom, 
the more completely he can assume the responsibility that goes with his 
integrity as a person. 
The view held by Rogers is little different. The human person, "when 
functioning freely," is "constructive and trustworthy" or, in the terminology 
used in other parts of this chapter, responsible. After a quarter of a 
century of experience in psychotherapy Rogers comes to what he calls an 
"inescapable" conclusion, namely, that "when we are aole to free the individua 
from defensiveness, so that he is open to the wide range of his own needs, as 
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well as the wide range of environmental and social demands, his reactions 
must be trusted to be positive, forward-moving, constructive" (Rogers, 1961, · 
p. 194). The position Rogers is assuming here, as Arnold* points out, is a 
form of angelism. Whether Rogers is aware of this implication in his state-
ment is not clear from the contex·t. What is clear is that, although he 
expects the human person to approach this level of freedom and responsibility, 
he does not expect him to attain it completely. 
Rogers is not particularly concerned about how the person is taught :to 
be responsible. There is no need, he claims, to be overly concerned about 
how man will relate to others, for one of his deepest needs is "for 
affiliation and communication with others:" as the person becomes more fully 
himself he will more easily and naturally relate. Neither is there need 
to be overly concerned about how he will control his aggression: as he 
becomes open to all his impulses, his need to receive and express affection 
will be as strong as his need to "strike out and seize for himself" (Rogers, 
1961, p. 194). In other words, as the person advances to the position of 
"being open to all. his experiences," he will become more responsible. His 
behavior, as Rogers says, will be more 'thalanced and realistic." 
For th.e widely held view that man is not responsible and that he is 
basically irrational Rogers has little sympathy. The human person ts 
behaviour, he would maintain, is "exquisitely rational" (Rogers, 1961, p •. 195} 
The tragedy for most is that their "defenses" keep them from being aware of 
*In a note to the wri.ter. 
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the fact: consciously they are moving in one direction, organismically they 
are moving in another. Decrease the number of these defenses, Rogers argues; 
and you increase a person's participation in what he calls the "rationality 
of his organism." The nec,essary control of impulses, he believes, would be 
found in the "natural and internal balancing o,f one need against another" 
(Rogers, 1961). Participating this way in what Rogers calls the ''.vastly 
complex self-regulatory activities of his organism" (1961, p. 195), the 
human person achieves a greater yet easier balance. He is freer, in other 
words, to be more responsible. 
From the evidence provided in this chapter it would appear that 
·responsibility as conceived by the psychologists is different from the 
-
fuller concept expressed hy the Vatican documents. Seen by the latter as a 
consequence or concomitant of the fact that the person has a purpose in life 
which he is free to pursue, responsibility is viewed as both a duty and a 
privilege; it is not reduced> as it may appear in Rogers, to a balanced 
response to organismic needs; or, in Snygg and Combs, to a successful 
adjustment to environmental conditions (cf. Arnold in Arnold and Gasson, 1954, 
p. 9). In the conciliar concept of "responsible freedom" there are several 
important implications which have to be spelled out. The first is the 
necessity of providing opportunities for the personal exercise of responsibil-, 
ity (item 2, Table 4); the second, the contribution this exercise of 
responsibility can make to the life of the community at large (item 3, Table 
4}; and third, the witness and significance of this exercise of responsibility 
for those seeking a meaning in life (item 4, Table 41. 
Allowing for these differences between the conciliar understanding of 
TABLE 4 
RESPONSIBILITY--SUMMARIZING VATICAN DOCUMENTS AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS 
VATICAN DOCUMENTS 
1. PRIVILEGE TO EXERCISE RESPONSIBILITY 
-"Inalienable responsibility for own 
decisions and actions (Abbot) 
-"Privilege to bear personal 
· ( responsibility" DH 2 
-"Responsible freedom" DH 1 
2. OPPORTUNITY FOR RESPONSIBILITY: 
-"Opportunity to exercise 
responsibility" GS 18 
-"Personal choices" GS 18 
-·"Govern actions with a sense of 
responsibility" DH 8 
3. RESPONSIBILITY FOR OTHERS: 
-"Fulfilling one's duties in 
conununity life" DH 8 
-"Personal contribution" 
PC 14 DH 
4. MEANING FOR . EX~STENCE, FOR 
"LIVING ,AND HOPING" GS 4, 13 
SNYGG AND COMBS 
"Part controlled ••• part 
- controlling" 
"Set free .... in order to 
assume responsibility" 
CARL ROGERS 
"Balanced and realistic" 
"Exquisitely rational" 
"Rationality of his organism" 
"Reactions must be trusted to 
be positive, forward-moving, 
constructive" 
''Need for affiliation and 
communication with others" 
: I 
.;i:.. 
N 
I 
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responsibility and that of the psychologists, the latter nevertheless make 
interesting observations. Syngg and Combs, as has been shown, depart from 
their earlier views and take a position leading towards that of the documents. 
Rogers, as indicated, approaches a certain angelism. His view of the person 
participating in the "rationality of his organism" even recalls the view 
of St. Thomas Aquinas, where man's organism, through his internal senses, 
participates in his rationality. The difference is that Roger has it in 
reverse: for him, it is the organism that is rational, and not the person! 
.. 
( 
-44-
CHAPTER 5 
COMPETENCE IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
A third characteristic of the integral perfection of the human person is 
relatedness to others or what may be more appropriately termed competence in 
interpersonal relations. In a sense this is a consequence of the two elements 
already treated. The significance of this characteristic for the proper 
functioning of the human person can be demonstrated from both theoretical and 
practical considerations. 
Taking with the documents call "enlarged freedom" (item 1, Table 5) as 
a basis, this chapter will deal successively.with the ways in which greater 
competence in interpersonal relationships makes possible a greater develop-
ment of human resources (item 2, Table 5), assures greater personal awareness 
of others (item 3, Table 5), and la;s the foundation for the growth of 
I 
friendship and love among men (item 4, Table 5}. In view of the present 
trends towards greater socialization in society this growth in friendsh~p and 
love among men is assuming more and more importance in the world today (item 
5, Table 5). For this reason the chapter will draw attention to the emphasis 
the documents place on the need for cultivating more adequate interpersonal 
relations among men (item 5, Table 5}. 
Theoretically, it could be argued that the less need a person has for 
defenses, the less crippled he is by feelings of worthlessness, the less 
restricted he is by repressions and inhibitions of his own making (cf. GS, 
12, 13) and by the physical, social'and economic limitations imposed by his 
, 
environment (GS, 27, 63; PP, 9), the freer he is to experience and cultivate 
those emotions which facilitate adequate relations with others. These 
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TABLE 5 
INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCE--SUMMARIZING VATICAN 
DOCUMENTS AND CONTE}fPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS 
1. 
VATICAN DOCUMENTS 
"ENLARGED FREEDOM" PC 14 
AS BASIS 
2. DEVELOPING HUMAN RESOURCES: 
-Making available "resources of 
their minds and wills" PC 14 
-Man, a social being, needs 
others to "live and develop 
own potential" GS 12 
3. INCREASING PERSONAL AWARENESS: 
-"Socialization ... personali-
zation" GS 12 
-"Truly personal relationships" 
GS 6 
-"Increasing sense of solidarity" 
AA 14 
4. FOUNDATION FOR GROWTH OF 
FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE: 
-"Helping one another through 
friendship" AA 17 
-"Sign of love" AA 30 
-"Finding self through sincere 
gift of self" GS 24 
5. CULTIVATION OF INTERPERSONAL 
SKILLS AND QUALITIES AA 14; 
GS 6, 12 
SNYGG AND COMBS 
"Less feelings of guilt and failure" 
"Does not deny or distort feelings" 
"Less compulsion to prove oneself" 
"Dependent on good will and co-
operation of others" 
"Living effectively with others" 
"Living efficiently with others" 
"An open accepting relationship with 
the world about him" 
"Characteristic corrern for his fellows" 
"To appreciate, accept and love" 
"Actualization of those with whom one 
is identified" ••. "Give of themselves" 
-:: • < 
ABRAHAM MASLOW 
cept themselves at all levels" 
·lative lack of overriding guilt, of 
ippling shame, and of any extreme of 
vere anxiety" 
. ep feeling of identification" 
me ins chaf ts gefuhl" 
of ..• sympathy and 
fusion, greater love, and 
perfect identification" 
-A6-
CARL ROGERS . 
Less need for "defensive distortion of 
perception" 
"Exhibiting defensive behavior" 
Need of "unconditional positive 
regard from significative others" 
Living with others in "maximum 
possible harmony" 
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emotions, "variations of human love," as Arnold calls them, are considered 
absolutely essential to the growth of those relationships without which it 
is very difficult for the human person to develop properly (Arnold, 1963, II, 
' p. 312). It is within this context, it seems, that the documents speak of , 
the necessity of helping men and women (religious especially) achieve in 
their interpersonal relations that sense of "enlarged freedom" which 
releases, as it were, or makes available for themselves and others all the 
"resources of their minds and wills •.• their gifts of nature and of grace" 
(PC, 14). 
With the foundations for sound interpersonal relations thus laid, the 
documents go on to establish other practical"reasons for developing 
competence in this area. 
The first is the need men have of one another for the full development 
of their capacities. "By his innermost nature," argues The Church in the 
Modern World, "man is a social being, and unless he relates himself to others 
he can neither live nor develop his own potential" (GS, 12). The second 
is the need arising from the developing pattern of social life. Here the 
document is arguing for the same interpersonal competency, basin~ its 
argument this time on the fact of the increasing socialization of human 
life throughout history and what it terms the increasing "personalization" 
of organizational relationships. "A man's ties with his fellows," runs the 
argument, "are constantly being multiplied," a reali.ty of contemporary life 
which the present day trend towards "socialization" is making more obvious. 
Given this trend, the document concludes, and the "further ties" it develops 
between men, the promotion of what it calls "appropriate personal developm~nt -
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and truly personal relationships" becomes imperative (GS, 6): The same 
argument is resumed in the document on the laity where the emphasis is placed, 
not directly on interpersonal relationships themselves but rather on the 
virtues thought to underly them--"honesty, justice, sincerity, kindness, and 
courage" (AA, 4}_. 
A third reason arises from the nature of the true Christian life. The 
lay people in the Church are urged to observe "among the signs of the time 
the irresistibly increasing _sense of solidarity among all peoples" and 
therefore to "co~operate with all men ••• to promote whatever is true and 
just" (AA, 14}. Especially are they to "help one another through friend-
ship." In this way, says the document on the laity, they will "gain strength 
to overcome the disadvantages of an increasingly isolated life and activity 
and to make their apostolate more productive" (AA, 17}. Even children, 
argues the document, must be educated "to transcend the family circle ••• to 
open their minds" and to go out warmly and confidently to others (AA, 30). 
This, concludes the document, is the very sign by which Christians are 
known, "the· sign of love" (AA, 8}. 
A fourth reason is the nature of the basis dyadic human relationship 
found in marriage. It is not for nothing, especially in view of what 
has been said above in the three preceding paragraphs, that the documents 
begin to conceive marriage. fundamentally as an interpersonal communion. 
The relationship, or rather the "companionship" of the two married partners, 
provides in the mind of The Church in the Modern-World, the model of "the 
primary form of interpersonal connnunion" (GS, 12}_. The mutual surrender 
of one person to the other in this sort of union becomes the prototype, so 
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to speak, for the sort of relationship that completes man. The human person, 
who, according to the documents, is "the only creature on earth which God 
willed for itself cannot," it seems, "fully find himself except through 
a sincere gift of self" (GS, 24). 
For these reasons the documents lay heavy stress on the cultivation of 
competence in interpersonal relations, not only in lay people (AA, 14; GS, 6) 
and partners in marriage particularly (GS, 12, 48), but also in those living 
in a celibate community as religious (PC, 14, 18) and especially in the 
clergy. The latter are urged to acquire those virtues which are, as t~e doc-
ument on priests says, "deservedly esteemed in human affairs •.• goodness of 
heart, sincerity, strength, and constancy of~character, zealous pursuit of 
justice, civility," and the like (PO, 3). But the acquisition of these 
virtues is not to be left to chance; it is to be initiated in the seminary, 
where the proper interpersonal dimension is to be emphasized right from the 
start. What is required, says the document on the formation of the clergy, 
are "the abilities most appropriate for the promotion of dialogue with men ••• 
a capacity to listen to other people and to open their hearts in a spirit 
of charity to the various circumstances of human need" (OT, l~, 1.9). 
Passing now, as has been done in the preceding chapters, to a comparison 
between the conciliar image of the human person along this dimension of 
interpersonal relations and the image presented by our representative four 
contemporary psychologists, significant parallels are to be noted. 
Beginning with Snygg and Combs concept, it is to be noted that a certain 
degree of interpersonal competence is not only characteristic of the 
"adequate" personality but also necessary for normal functioning of any 
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person. "We are so entirely dependent upon the goodwill and co-operation of 
others," claim these psychologists, "that it would be impossible to achieve 
feelings of adequacy without some effective relationship with them (Snygg 
and Combs, 1959, p. 246). As a consequence a man, quite plainly, "must b!= 
capable of living effectively and efficiently with his fellows" (p. 246). 
Living "effectively" with others implies the possession of the normal skills, 
the "know how," so to speak, of relating to other people. Living "efficiently' 
with others, however, implies much more. It implies not only the skills 
but also the dispositions that enable the possessor of them to relate in . 
such a way that his experience of these interpersonal relationships and 
acceptance of others is enriching and rewarding both for himself and others • 
.. 
This sort of acceptance of others generally presupposes a wholesome 
self-image and acceptance of self as pre-requisites. Characteristically, 
according to Snygg and Combs, the self-accepting person "accepts praise or 
criticism objectively," "does not deny or distort feelings, motives, or 
abilities in self," "sees self as a person of worth on an equal plane with 
others," "does not expect others to reject him," "does not regard self as 
queer or abnormal," "is not shy or self-conscious," and so on (p. 257). 
The self-acceptant person acts this way, it seems, because he ha's "less 
feelings of guilt and failure." This freedom from pathological guilt, as 
Snygg and Combs seem to be conceiving it,· apparently "releases the individual,' 
and places him under "less compulsion to prove himself at the expense of 
others." This makes possible for the individual what the authors would 
describe as "an open accepting relationship with the world about him" (ibid., 
p. 258. Cf. Scheler, 1923, as quoted in Arnold, 1963, II; p. 312). 
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The one seems to follow from the other. Syngg and Combs are of the 
opinion that, "when one is strongly identified with others what he does to 
actualize self is likely to contribute also tothe actualization of those 
with whom he is identified-" (p. 257). With less pressing need, as we have 
indicated above, to demonstrate his adequacy or to thrust himself forward in 
areas where he feels deprived, he is free to take on this "characteristic 
concern for his fellows" (p. 258), to "accept, appreciate and love" them 
(p. 257). Such· a person, as these psychologists describe him, "does not 
hate, reject, or pass judgment on others" when they differ from him; he "does 
not attempt to dominate," nor "assume responsibility for others." He "does 
not deny the worth or equality of others;" in tact, in his "active interest 
in others" he demonstrates a "desire to serve" them and to create "mutually 
satisfactory relationships." Should he seem to be advancing self--and at time: 
he may seem to be by some.--he is "careful not to infringe the rights of 
others." Not only do such persons find it unnecessary and even repulsive 
to use others for solely personal gratification, they actually devote 
themselves to others in such a way that they can be said literally to "give 
of themselves'' (p. 257). 
Maslow argues the same way. He sees this concern for others as a 
characteristic of the interpersonal relat·ionships not only of his self-
actualizing persons, but also as an important element in the life of any 
person. He sees it as sterruning largely from a basic acceptance of se1.f. 
Self--actualizers, he claims, "accept themselves at all levels--love, safety, 
belongingness, honour, self-respect" (Maslow, 1954, p. 207)_. They can do 
this, he believes, because they can take what he calls "the frailties and sin, 
r 
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weaknesses and evils of human nature" in the same unquestioning spirit with 
which they accept nature itself. They accept nature "as it is, and not as 
they would prefer it to be" (p. 207). Many of these qualities--self-
acceptance, feeling of security, sense of belongingness, and the like, 
which may seem at first sight to be largely unconnected, tend to·be regarded 
by Maslow as they were also by Snygg and Combs, as deriving from a more 
basic condition, namely, a relative absence of pathological guilt, of a 
sense of worthlessness, and of "extreme or severe anxiety" (p. 219). It is 
the basically deprived man, the anxious man that considers the world a 
dangerous place, a "jungle," as Maslow would put it, "an enemy territory 
.. 
populated by (l} those whom he can dominate and (2) those who can dominate 
him" (p. 232) • 
Persons functioning more normally see the world differently. They 
have, in Maslowian terms, "a deep feeling of id~ntification, sympathy, and 
affection" Q1aslow, p. 217} in spite of the occasional hostility, anger, or 
disgust which, as Maslow explains, quoting Erich Fromm, is not character-
based but more likely reactive or situational (p. 219). To catch more 
precisely the particular flavour of these feelings for mankind that Maslow 
finds in his self-actualizers he uses the word Gemeinschaftsgef~hl, invented 
for the purpose by Alfred Adler (p. 217). These people, Maslow claims, have 
"deeper and more profound interpersonal relations" than others. On that 
account they are capable of "more fusion, greater love, and more perfect 
identification" with others, together with a greater sense of mutual 
enrichment, than many people would consider possible (p. 219). 
Rogers, though considerably briefer and more technical (1959, pp. 234-
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40) in his treatment of this characteristic of interpersonal.relationships, 
proceeds in much the same way. Because his "fully-functioning" person 
enjoys a better self-image he has less need for what is described as a 
"defensive distortion of perception" and less need therefore of "exhibiting 
defensive behavior" (p. 237); consequently he will be more open to others. 
In this way he stands to experience the "unconditional positive regard from 
significant others" which, according to Rogers, is a characteristic condition 
of his growth and development as a person (p. 234). But, saysRogers, because 
this positive regard is "reciprocal" and tremendously rewarding,.this person 
will "live with others in the maximum possible harmony" (p. 235). 
It is clear that the documents of Vatican II are pointing out 
implications for interpersonal relations that go far beyond those envisaged 
by the psychologists. Restricting their study more to the obstacles impeding 
healthy interpersonal relationships, some of them, Snygg and Combs 
particularly, tend to concentrate on questions of anxiety and guilt. This, 
coupled with the tendency to regard all guilt as pathological, tends to put 
them in conflict (~f. Arnold, 1954, p. 515; 1960, II, pp. 291-297; 302-6) 
with the position taken by the documents (cf. GS, 28), and indeed with. the 
other psychologists, particularly Maslow (1954, p. 2071: 
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CHAPTER 6 
PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY 
A fourth characteristic of the human person which the conciliar 
documents seem to stress is that of man the producer--the productive person. 
This is a picture of the person who can cope with life, whose manner of acting 
is positive and constructive, who enjoys a certain measure of self-confidence, 
entertains positive feelings about himself, accepts himself, is uncomplicated 
and straightforward in his handling of situations; whose whole response ·to 
life, in short, can be best described by words like efficiency, productivity, 
or even creativity. Some of these characteristics could bear lengthier 
elaboration. • 
Concentrating on the dimension of productivity and efficiency, this 
chapter will attempt to compare the way this characteristic of the human 
person is presented in the Vatican documents with the way it is presented in 
theffilected group of psychologists. Noting first that, when man is 
( 
functioning efficiently and productively, he not only copes better with life 
but also becomes himself more effective in the process (item 1, Table 6), it 
will then consider the question of how this comes about. It will show in turn 
that in this condition the person, being less defensive and more open to 
reality (item 2a, Table 6}, becomes a mor~ reliable instrument (item 2b, 
Table 6); that, because he is more open and more reliable'as an instrument, 
he has more access to data and is therefore likely to come up with better 
solutions to his problems (item 3, Table 6); and that, as a result, he is 
generally more straightforward and uncomplicated (item 4, Table 6) in his 
general response to life. 
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TABLE 6 
EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY--SUMMARIZING VATICAN 
DOCUMENTS AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS 
VATICAN DOCUMENTS 
1. MORE EFFICIENT AND PRODUCTIVE 
-Productive GS 35 
-Copes effectively GS 10, 33-39, 
84 
. 2. MORE DATA AVAILABLE: 
-Less defensive GS 17 
-Efficient instrument OT 11 
3. BETTER SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS 
OT 11 
4. STRAIGHTFORWARD, UNCOMPLICATED 
WAY OF ACTING OT 11 
SNYGG AND COMBS 
"Behaves more effectively and 
efficiently" 
"Open to all experiences 
"More data available" 
"Capable of seeing relationships not 
seen by others" 
"Behaves from choice rather than 
from necessity" 
"No great necessity for self-defense 
and less neeed to distort or select 
perceptions" 
"Trust in himself and his own capa-
cities and perceptions" 
"Feelings, attitudes, etc., effective 
and efficient guides to behavior" 
"Self as an on-going sensitive; 
trustworthy instrument" 
"Wider,· less complicated, more 
precise and accurate perception 
of events" 
ABRAHAM MASLOW 
redictions of future ..• more correct" 
( 
arger horizon, wider breadth of vision, 
·. iving in widest frame of reference" 
erceptions less based upon wish, desire, 
·,,'ear, or upon generalized character-
, ,' etermined optimism" 
.;. 
.· ognitively efficient" 
), '{ 
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CARL ROGERS 
"More open to experience" 
"Accurate symbolization in 
awareness" 
"Self as locus of evaluation" 
"Organismic valuing a trusthworthy 
guide to most satisfying 
behavior" 
"Unique and creative Adaptation 
to the newness of that moment" 
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The question of productivity can be considered first. The notion 
conveyed here by the documents is that of the person who is productive, not 
in the sense of producing things but in the sense of improving himself. 
"When a man works," says The Church in the Modern World, "he not only alters 
things and society, he develops himself as well" (GS, 35). In the thought 
of the document, the person enjoys priority over the things he produces, be 
these things material things, "technical advantages" or even more spiritual 
things like the "more humane ordering of social relationships." "A man is 
more precious," cliams the document "for what he is than for what he has" 
(GS, 35). What he has accumulated is by no means insignificant, but what is 
more significant is the fact that in the process of accumulation man also, 
as the document concludes, "learns much .•• cultivates his resources •. goes 
outside and beyond himself." 
In going "outside and beyond himself" man escapes from the prison of 
his own self and is left free to cope more effectively with the situation 
around him. But this is not always easy for, as The Church in the Modern 
World says~ 1'the imbalances under which the modern world labours are linked 
with that more basic imbalance rooted in the heart of man" (GS, 10). 11In 
man himself," the document continues, "many elements wrestle with one 
another;" on that account he "experiences .•. limitations in a multitude of ways~' 
yet at the same time he is ''boundless in his desiresn to tackle the problems 
beyond himself. This, in fact, is one of the main preoccupations of the 
document--to dispel the many false conceptions of the Christian attitude 
towards involvement (GS, 33-39). Man is not expected to remain turned in 
u~on himself, but to accept himself and his limitations and then to get out 
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and go beyond himself, to learn to cope with the problems of the day (GS, 10), 
whether they be the pressing needs of establishing deeper international 
understanding and co-operation on the one hand (GS, 83-90) or the less 
spectacular but equally pr~ssing needs of providing "food, supplies, 
health, education, and labour" on the other (GS, 84). 
This apparently is what the Council means by seeking for solutions which 
it describes as "fully human" (GS, 40). By thus imbuing the "everyday 
activity of.men with a deeper meaning and importance" the Council sees 
every undertaking as a means, not merely of overcoming a difficuity but also, 
and especially, of bringing man to his full stature as a human person, of 
"making the family of man and its history," as the document puts it, more 
• 
human." This, the Council believes, is to be one of its greatest contributioni 
-·-its "healing and elevating impact on the dignity of the person" (GS, 40). 
A third note in this concept of the productive man is the increased 
capacity he enjoys for studying the problems confronting him. Given that 
he has been liberated from the things that put constraints upon his freedom; 
given also that he enjoys a greater sense of responsibility and that he is 
less defensive in his relations with others; given all these things, then 
it might be expected that he would be more capable of making an objective 
appraisal of the data before him. When a man has been emancipated from "all 
captivity to passion," as the documents have it, the means he chooses wil1:-
be more "apt," his action will be more "effective and skilful," and the goal 
he proposes will be pursued with a more "spontaneous choice" (GS, 17) ~· All 
of which implies, according to the document on the formation of the clergy, 
a "degree of human maturity ... a certain emotional stability ..• (and) an ability 
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to make considered decisions;" which in turn implies a certa:J_n positive, 
acceptant view of oneself, and a readiness to rely on oneself as a reliable 
and efficient instrument; in short, "a solid maturity of personality" (OT, 11). 
Related notes are the· originality of the productive man, his greater 
energy, and relatively simple, straightforward way of acting (OT, 11). Freed 
from the things that bind him from within, man now finds himself directing his 
energies to things outside him, to improving the environmental conditions undet 
which he lives and particularly those under which he works. He demands 
greater participation in the conduct of the institutions which.touch his 
life; a greater share in the administration and profits of the enterprises 
in which he earns his bread (GS, 68); then he begins to direct his attention 
to improving the socio-politico-juridical order of the country in which he 
lives (GS, 93). Finally he turns himself to the world at large, attempting, 
by his labour and knowledge, to bring the whole of it "under his control" 
(GS, 53, 63). 
Man, in other words, attempts to make his history rather than passively 
have it happen to him. But what the documents are saying here about man in 
his history and in his culture generally (GS, 53-72) can be said about any 
man in particular. Free him so that he can act more from choice than from 
necessity, develop his facility for relating with others, make him more aware 
of his responsibility, and he will discover for himself a way of acting which 
will not only make him more effective and productive but also leave him with 
a feeling of what it is to perform efficiently. 
Turning from the conciliar documents to the writings of our four 
psychologists we find the same' theme of the human person as the efficient, 
MU 21 $ $i2 XS# .. 
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productive and creative agent extensively elaborated by cont~mporary 
psychology. 
On the dimension of efficiency the ''adequate personality" rates very high. 
This personality, claim Snygg and Combs, ''behaves more effectively and more 
efficiently than his less adequate fellows (Snygg artd Combs, 1959, p. 246). 
The reason given is that, freer in himself, he is "open to all experience." 
Being under "no great necessity for self-defense, he has less need," explain 
these writers, "to distort his perceptions or to select them in terms of his 
peculiar unfulfilled goals or desires." Thus equipped, he is freer to 
devote "much greater time and attention to wider fields of experience" (p. 252), 
to examine things that are perhaps intimida1:ing or unpleasant to others, and 
so cope better with life and its demands (p. 239}. Such a person, claims 
the authors, is "capable of seeing relationships not seen by others" and, 
as a result is less likely to "confuse means and ends" (p. 253}. With this 
wider and more reliable perspective on which to base a response, he is able 
to behave more "from choice than from necessity" (p. 250). 
The gains from this are considerable. The greater reliability in 
perception and the resulting effectiveness in behavior are likely to produce 
in the individual over a suitable period of time an increased "trust in himself 
and his own capacities and perceptions" (p. 254). Gradually, according to 
Snygg and Combs, he discovers that "his feelings, attitudes, beliefs and 
-
understandings are more often than not effective and efficient guides to 
behaving" (p. 255). In this way and with the appreciation and approval of 
those who note and admire his more effective behavior, he learns to accept 
himself as a more reliable instrument. an "on-1wing. sensitive •. trustworthy. 
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process" (p. 255)_. The accumulation of these positive perceptions about 
himself enable him to build up such a reservoir of positive feelings which, 
say the psychologists, can serve as a shock-absorber or security base against 
which the "damaging experiences" of one's day-to..,.day existence can be 
reflected (p. 242}. 
Besides coming to accept himself as a more trusthworthy and spontaneous 
instrument, the person who is functioning well will come up with solutions 
to life's problems that are at once "more adequate, creative and original" 
(p. 253}. This is a consequence, it seems, of what Snygg and Combs see as 
the person's capacity to "penetrate more directly and sharply to the heart 
of problems" (p. 251}. Since his perception of reality is apparently ''wider, 
less complicated, more precise and accurate," his response to life and life's 
situations is likewise more straightforward and uncomplicated (p. 254). 
This straightforward, uncomplicated relationship to life in turn makes 
possible an even "greater awareness, a·quicker perception, and a more 
accurate judgment of all aspects of experience, including self" (p. 255). 
/ 
All of which gives this person an enormous advantage in dealing with life. 
Virtually the same conclusion is reached by Maslow in discussing the 
efficiency dimension of his self-actualizing person. His argument is also 
roughly the same: because of this person's greater openness to wider and 
better data, he is more likely to come up with better solutions to his 
problems. Beginning at the perceptual behavior of this sort of person, 
Maslow argues that his "predictions of the future from whatever facts were 
in hand at the time seemed to be more of ten correct because less based upon 
wish, desire, anxiety, fear, or upon generalized character-determined 
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optimism" (p. 204). Citing the English psychoanalyst, Money.-Kyrle, he argues .'. 
that it is possible to call the neurotic person not only "relatively but 
absolutely inefficient" simply because he fails to perceive reality as 
accurately or efficiently'as the healthy person. The neurotic, Maslow 
concludes, is "not only emotionally sick, he is cognitively wrong" (p. 204). 
Pushing his discussion to the higher cognitive levels of behavior, 
Maslow advances two further arguments. In one place he argues that "a priori 
considerations encourage the hypothesis that this superiority in the 
perception of reality eventuates in a superior ability to reason, to perceive 
the truth, to come to conclusions, to be logical, and to be cognitively 
efficient in general" (p. 205). In another place he argues that "the 
impression of being above small things, of having a larger horizon, a wider 
breadth of vision, of living in the widest frame of reference, sub specie 
aeternitatis, is of the utmost social and interpersonal importance" (p. 212). 
Rogers has little to say on the question of efficiency. His 
understanding of efficiency in the fully functioning person is similar to 
that of Snygg and Combs and Maslow. Not only are his conclusions similar 
but his premises are also much the same. The fully functioning person is 
efficient because, being more open to his experience,.he has greater access 
to available data--"the social demands, his own complex and possibly 
conflicting needs, his memories of similar situations, and his perception of 
the uniqueness of this situation." All this data, Rogers admits, 'would be 
very complex indeed," were it not that the person __ could permit ''his total 
organism (sense impressions •.. previous learnings ••• visceral and iriternal states 
and so on), his consciousness participating, to consider each stimulus, need, 
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and demand, its relative intensity and importance, and out of this complex 
weighing and balancing, discover that course of action which would come 
closest to satisfying all his needs in the situation" (Rogers, 1961, p. 190). 
The defects which, according to Rogers, render this process sometimes 
untrustworthy are the inclusion of information which is irrelevant to the 
situation at hand, or the exclusion of information which is relevant. It 
is when "memories and previous learnings" are fed into the judging process 
as "if they were this reality," and not just memories and learnings; or, as 
Rogers continues, when certain "threatening experiences are inhibited from 
awareness," and hence withheld from the judging proces~ or fed into it in 
distorted form, that the wrong responses are forthcoming. If, on the other 
hand, people can remain open to all their experiences and trust their own 
reactions, they stand to be surprised at the appropriateness of their own 
behavioral responses. They will come to meet each new situation with a 
response which Rogers would describe as "a unique and creative adaptation 
to the newness of that moment" (1959, p. 235). 
-
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CHAPTER 7 
FULFILLMENT 
This chapter deals with the last of the characteristics of the human 
person as described by the' Vatican documents--fulfillment. They focus on 
the nature of this experience, describing it as a certain joy or satisfac·t~ 
(item 1, Table 7), a certain feeling of dignity and worth (item 2, Table 
or a certain openness to change and fullness of personality (item 3, Table 
This experience is seen as natural and is expressed in spontaneous behavior 
(item 4, Table 71. It seems clear that these psychologists often miss the 
implications of the Vatican II documents that fulfillment is the result of 
productive and effective living. Instead, •they describe the subjective 
feelings that indicate mental health or self-actualization and that make 
it possible to live productive and fulfilled lives. Thus it is possible that 
feelings arising from a "living out" of one's drives (cf. Arnold, 1954, p. 7), 
unrestrained and without reference to one's objective final goal, may be 
mistaken for fulfillment. Likewise spontaneity (cf. Snygg and Combs, 195J, 
p. 252) is sometimes taken to indicate fulfillment (cf. Gasson, p. 167}. But 
neither of these concepts concurs fully with the wider implications of the 
documents. 
On the supposition that a man can be· freed from most of the things that 
impede the exercise of his freedom; that he has acquired a proper sense of 
responsibility; that his relations with others are mutually sustaining, 
stimulating, edifying; that he is more efficient, more productive and so 
achieve more; on the supposition that these conditions are present,_ the 
documents then seem to say that the person is more satisfied, more joyful, 
1. 
TABLE 7 
:. FULFILLMENT--SUMMARIZING VATICAN DOCUMENTS 
AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGISTS 
VATICAN DOCUMENTS 
JOY, SATISFACTION, FULFILLMENT 
GS 9, 13, 14, 35, 75 
SNYGG AND COMBS 
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2. FEELING OF DIGNITY AND WORTH 
GS 15, 33 
,; I 
I :r 
"Dignity and worth ••. self-actualizat{on. :: 
1 './ . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-+~~~~~~~~~~--'~~--rl,: 
3. OPENNESS AND FULL DEVELOP-
MENT OF PERSONALITY GS 9, 
PC 18, LG 46 
4. SPONTANEOUS--"IMPELLED BY 
NATURE" DH 2 
5. OWN RESPONSIBILITY 
(Encyclical on the Develop-
ment of Peoples) 
"Rich self .•. can afford to be 
gent" 
"Spontaneous and creative behavior" 
" f 
I 
I 
l 
! 
ABRAHAM MASLOW 
"Capacity to appreciate freshly and 
naively" 
FaCility for "enjoying life" 
"Fulfilling themselves" 
"Problem centered vs. ego centered" 
"Developing to their full stature" 
"Potentialities and latent resources" 
"A superior awareness of own subjec-
tive reactions" 
"Pleasant and ecstatic" 
"Philosophic acceptance of the nature 
of his self'' 
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CARL ROGERS 
"Enriching, exciting, challenging, 
meaningful" 
·"Process •. vs. static condition" 
"Wider range of! •• increasing openness 
• , II to •.. experience 
"More sensitive .•• greater variety •.. 
greater richness" 
"Maximum adaptability" 
"Flowing, changing organization of 
self-personality" 
"It feels right" 
' 
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experiences a greater self-worth; in short, is fulfilled (GS, 9, 13, 35, 75). 
Fulfillment and joy in the sense of mere blissfulness or contentment do 
not quite catch the meaning implied in the documents. What is intended is 
something stronger, something enriching, rewarding. Joy or fulfillment, in 
the sense intended here, is more like the feeling that accompanies the best 
exercise of one's capacities (GS, 15). With this experience comes the 
feeling that one can cope adequately with his environment and successfully 
meet the challenge that life confronts him with. From this experience 
there develops also a certain confidence in oneself: a trust in one's 
capacities, a reliance in the validity of one's feelings, and a sureness and 
sense of appropriateness in the time and manner of expressing them. In 
short, he begins to experience himself as a significant, competent, trust-
worthy, acceptable and lovable person (GS, 14). All of which gives rise, not 
only to a feeling of integrity, well-being and worthwhileness in himself 
(GS, 26), but also to sustaining and fruitful relations with his fellows 
(GS, 25}. 
This sort of fulfillment is something which all men seek. The desire 
for it is universal. It is discernible too at all levels, whether it be in 
man himself, say, in an achievement like learning to walk; in his technology, 
say, in learning to fly; or in his bi;-oader socio-political life. On the 
latter level, for example, it is recently and even dramatically apparent in 
the undeveloped yet emerging countries of the world.· "Persons and societies," 
says The Church in the Modern World , "thirst for a full and free life 
worthy of man" (GS, 9); and this is true for the lower, uneducated classes. 
"Laborers and farmers (in these undeveloped countries) seek not only to 
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provide for the necessities of life but to develop (also) the gifts of their 
personality by their labors" or by what the same document calis elsewhere 
"culture-.,.the cultivation of natural goods and values" (GS, 53). 
This cultivation of the gifts of personality and the achievement thereby 
of "an authentic and full humanity" are held up as a goal for all people 
(GS, 53}. Religious are urged to seek it "earnestly" in all places or aspects 
of their development--"spiritual, doctrinal, and professional" (PC, 18). 
The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church asserts, for example, that "the 
profession of the evangelical counsels, though entailing renunciation of 
certain values which undoubtedly merit high esteem, does not detract from a 
genuine development of human perfection (LG, 46). Likewise the document on 
the renewal of the religious life asserts that it is not enough that celibate 
religious "only be warned of the dangers confronting chastity;" they should 
also be "trained to make a celibate life consecrated to God part of the 
richness of their whole personality" (PC, 12}. The same goal of fulfillment 
is seen in all other aspects of man's life--in his marriage (GS, 52), in 
his cultural life (GS, 60}, in his socio-economic life (GS, 63-72), in his 
political life (GS, 73-76), and above all in himself, with the reminder of the 
impossibility of this "fulfillment apart from God" (GS, 13). 
All this is urged upon man because it is natural. This seeking for 
enrichment and fulfillment represents a legitimate longing of the human 
heart. Man is "impelled" to seek it "by nature" and also by the internalized 
values and standards of his own society. By the very fact of its being 
natural, however, man is also bound to it, as the document on religious 
freedom points out, by a "moral obligation'' (PH, 18). Paradoxical though it 
r 
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may seem to speak of an obligation to fulfillment, the documents insist. 
Because sin has, in their view, "diminished man" thereby "blo~king his 
path to fulfillment" (GS, 13), it is necessary that from time to time he be 
reminded of it. Even civil authority can help--"by bringing about conditions,~ 
as The Church in the Modern World says, "more likely to help citizens and 
groups freely to attain to complete human fulfillment with greater effect" 
(GS, 75). In the last analysis, however, and notwithstanding the nudgings of 
civil authorities or the reminders of the Church man is ultimately responsible 
for his own fulfillment. "Endowed with intelligence and freedom, he (every 
man)," says Paul VI in an encyclical statement quoted above (Chapter 2, i), 
"is responsible for his fulfillment as he is for his salvation. He is aided, 
or sometimes impeded, by those who educate him and those with whom he lives, 
but each one remains, whatever be the influences affecting him, the principal 
agent of his own success or_ failure." It is up to the individual himself. 
"By the unaided effort of his own intelligence and his will," concludes the 
encyclical, "each man can grow in humanity, can enhance his personal worth, 
can become more a person" (PP, 151. 
The above excerpt from Paul VI's encyclical goes further than our 
contemporary psychologists on this question of fulfillment. Where the 
documents are objective, the psychologists tend to concentrate on subjective 
experience. While, for instance, the conciliar term "fulfillment" is the 
result of effective and efficient living, in view of man's objective final 
goal, for Snygg and Combs it would imply something more subjective--"personal 
feelings of dignity and integrity, feelings of worth and self-actualization." 
People who experience these feelings, according to these authors, are thought 
-70-
to live more integrally complete lives. 
In the first place, Snygg and Combs point out, these people seem to be · 
able to "utilize themselves and their experience as the basic frame of 
reference for much of their behavior" (p. 254). In the second place, their 
behavior is much freer and more spontaneous. Growing out of the same basic 
characteristics--respect for their own dignity and integrity--is a greater 
capacity for what the psychologists call "spontaneous creative behavior" 
(p. 252). With less need to be defensive, these people who enjoy a greater 
fulfillment do not have to "maintain rigid and narrow lines of operation. 1 ' 
Whereas the "poor self must shelter and protect his investments with 
scrupulous care and conservatism," the "rich. self" by contrast "can afford 
. 
to be extravagant." Such is the inner strength..and security of these 
people that they could, according to Snygg and Combs, even "risk themselves 
in experimentation" (p. 253)_. 
Maslow also cites this spontaneity or facility for "enjoying life" 
as one of the more noticeable. characteristics of the people he would consider 
to be most completely alive. Closer to the conciliar documents than Snygg 
and Combs, he observes this quality in diverse areas of the lives of his 
subjects. 
He notices it first in their own sense of dignity and worth. These 
people, he claims, seem to be "fulfilling-eli.emselves and to be doing the 
best they are capable of doing;" they "have .•. developed" or "are developing" 
to their "full stature." (Maslow, 1954, p. 201}_~ For this ':'development and 
--
continued growth," he explains, they are dependent not so much on the world 
and people outside tfiem as on the "potentialities and latent resources" 
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within them (p. 2141. That does not mean, however, that they customarily 
turn away from the world and introspectively turn in on themselves; 
characteristically, they are "strongly focused" in the opposite direction, 
' 
on "some mission in life, some task to fulfill, some problem outside them-
selves." As Maslow puts it, they are "problem centred rather than ego-
centred" (p. 211). 
Notwithstanding this outward orientation in their lives, these people 
seem to be in extraordinarily close touch with their own feelings. Maslow 
remarks upon this as a second distinguishing characteristic. In fact, 
he asserts that the one implies the other. "Their (these people's) ease 
~ 
of penetration to reality" implies, he believes, "a superior awareness of 
their oW-U ... subjective reacitons in general" (p. 210). This awareness, he 
claims, can at times be "so pleasant or even ecstatic" that it would seem 
"almost sacrilegious" to cut it off; at other times it can be experienced 
with such tremendous intensification, absorption in the task or experience, 
and transcendence of self as to merit the title of what Maslow calls a 
"mystic experience" (p. 217). Another and perhaps more common version. of 
this sort of experience is what he describes as the "waderful capacity to 
appreciate again and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of life, 
with awe, pleasure, wonder, and even ecstasy" (p. 215). 
At the opposite end-of the scale from these so-called mystic experiences 
is a third characteristic of this sort of fulfillment in life. This is the 
person's basic acceptance of .reality as it is. The "philosophic acceptance 
of the nature of his self, of human nature, of much of social life, and 
of nature and physical reality" is, in Maslow' s view, the very foundation 
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of the person's whole value system. What he approves or disapproves of, what 
he is loyal to or opposes, what pleases or displeases him can, Maslow claims, 
"often be understood as surface derivations of this source trait of 
acceptance" (p. 230). 
Rogers, like Maslow, seems to be searching for a higher order variable 
to explain the characteristic the conciliar documents have been designating 
as fulfillment. The nearest he comes to it is describing a set of subjective 
feelings which, though not fulfillment, may accompany it. Eschewing feelings 
like pleasure, joy, satisfaction, he fastens on a set which he describes by 
words like "enriching, exciting, rewarding, challenging, meaningful" (Rogers, 
1961, p. 1861. But even these terms, he says, can be misleading: they are 
~ 
too static, suggesting that the person has already arrived at or achieved 
this condition of excitment or meaningfulness. To Rogers, this condition 
is not so much a state of being as a process: in this respect the person 
is continually changing (Rogers, 1959, p. 2351. 
In the process certain things happen to him. But again Rogers describes 
these things only at the level of subjective feeling--that is, not the 
characteristic itself but the subjective awareness ("experience," as he 
terms it .1961, p. 195]) ~-which still fails to describe adequately the 
fulfillment spoken of by the conciliar documents. 
He speaks, for example, of a fuller and more immediate awareness of 
self. This implies for Rogers a "wider range of" (1961, p. 195} and an 
"increasing openness to" experience (p. 189) than that afforded by a more 
constricting or less fulfilling way of living. Entering more fully into this. 
process means getting involved in what Rogers describ.es as the "frequently 
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frightening and frequently satisfying experience of a more sensitive living, 
with greater range, greater variety, greater richness" (p. 195). In practice 
this would mean living more intimately with and more sensitively aware of one'i:: 
' feelings of pain, anger, fear, courage, love, joy; a growing readiness to 
expose oneself to these feelings, to place oneself in jeopardy almost in 
order to discover and express more of oneself in the process. 
Putting this differently, Rogers describes it as an increasing tendency 
to live more fully in each moment. In his terms living in the moment means 
an absence of "rigidity," of "tight organization," of the "imposition of 
structure on experience." It means instead a "maximum of adaptability," 
~ 
a discovery of "structure in experience," a "flowing, changing organization 
of self and peJS)nality" (l961, p. 189). Or, to put it another way altogether, 
it means becoming a "participant in the ongoing process of organismic 
experience," as Rogers phrases it, rather than being outside of it as an 
observer or "in control of it." For this is a special additional quality 
is required. 
This is a certain confidence in oneself as a trustworthy instrument for 
facing up to life. This is the third characteristic. Living in the moment, 
in the sense implied above, involves a certain readiness to risk, which, 
unless one is to expose himself to the charge of rashness, demands a greater 
trust in one's own organism, in its capacity to experience and to perceive 
reliably and its capacity to direct. Given this ~rust, the criterion of what 
is the good and the appropriate thing to do is simJ21Y that "it feels right." 
Responding thus in a certain way or doing a certain thing for the sufficient 
and good reason that "it feels right" will prove in the end, according to 
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Rogers, a "component and trustworthy guide to behavior which is truly 
satisfying" (1961, p. 189). 
/ 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION AND APPLICATION 
-75-
This essay has a twofold objective. In view of the tremendous 
importance attached to the human person in the documents of Vatican Council 
II it sought first to develop some notion of the human person as described 
in the documents. Then, in view of the importance accorded to the contribu-
tions of the social sciences by the documents and their own claim that 
they themselves had been so open to those sciences, the essay sought 
secondly to compare this notion with those of four contemporary American 
psychologists. 
An outline of the whole work is sketched out in Chapter 2. The picture 
of the human person is briefly presented in the.first part of the chapter 
(see Table l); the parallel pictures presented by the contemporary 
psychologists in the second part (see Table 2}. Each dimension of the 
original conciliar picture is elaborated in the subsequent chapters (Chapters 
3-7} and then compared or contrasted with the picture presented by the 
psychologists. These comparisons are summarized in tabular form in Tables 
3-7. 
This presentation of the human person gives rise to two questions. 
One refers to the worth of such a presentation or the practical uses to 
which it can be put; the other, to the necessity of a more critical evaluatio 
of the two pictures of the human person. 
The latter can be considered first. Given/the claim of the conciliar 
documents (supra, Chapter 2) that they are "scrutinizing the signs of the 
times" and that they are responding in "language intelligible to each 
r 
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generation" (GS, 4)_ to the perennial questions man has asked about himself, 
it was to be expected that there would be many similarities between the 
picture of the human person presented in the documents and that presented 
by the contemporary psychologists. These similarities, it is believed, have 
been pointed out. But there are also differences. Some of these are obvious 
and have already been touched upon; others are perhaps less obvious and need 
to be resumed here. 
On the nature of man, for instance, the documents are explicit, 
particularly The Church in the Modern World (GS, 11-15, 24-32). But the 
same explicitness is missing from the writings of the psychologists. 
Understandably, it may not be their intention to treat this question; in 
many instances, however, there are implicit assumptions which reveal their 
position. Snygg and Combs, as has been pointed out (supra, Chapters 3-4), 
have removed from their later writings the more explicit statements on 
determinism and free will that were found in their earlier work; but certain 
implicit assumptions (of determinism} still linger in parts (cf. pp. 17, 310). 
In Rogers, too, as has been indicated, there lurks a certain trace either of 
angelism or of a Rousseau-like conception of the nature of man. Implications 
of these differ.ences are discernible in many ways. The conciliar. concept of 
responsibility, for example, with its emphasis on the inalienable 
responsibility of the human person for his own decisions and actions, goes 
much further than the pleas of some of the psychologists to trust the 
"rationality" of the organism. Likewise in the category of interpe:rsonal 
relations, the .conciliar concept goes beyond that-of the psychologists. It 
emphasizes go~ls of these relations, which extend far beyond the immediate 
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pleasure of the person concerned. In the category of fulfillment the gap 
between the two concepts is more pronounced. The description.of this ful-
fillment in terms of "rich," "exciting," "spontaneous" subjective feelings, 
as presented by the psychologists, does not carry the weight of the sober, 
objective description given in the documents. Likewise with the concept of 
spontanei'ty: as it is described by the psychologists, it is at times quite 
comparable with the rigid determinism of the brute (cf. Gasson, 1954, p. 167); 
on that account it falls short of the description of human fulfillment found 
in the documents. 
There are differences still. One is the tendency on the part of some 
of the psychologists to substitute metaphor for reality. Metaphorical 
expressions like the "flowing, changing organizations of personality" and 
figurative language like the breaking with "tradition and orthodoxy" 
leave the impression of a certain vagueness. A second difference is the 
tendency, of Maslow especially, to write at times as if, instead of reporting 
objective observations, he were merely expressing wishes. Statements like 
rising to one's "full stature" and maintaining a "certain inner detachment 
from the culture in which" and is "immersed" have a certain exhortatory or 
rhetorical ring. Some of these differences, it' is true, tend to be 
exaggerated by the way in which citations from the psychologists have been 
made. Whilst it is true that the method of quoting their exact words and 
short expressions preserves a certain flavor of verisimilitude and authentic-· 
ity, it introduces at the same time a certain artificiality. Aptness ?r 
/ 
felicity of phrase is no substitute for substance or depth of thought, yet 
the very methodology used in this essay has tended to favor the former over 
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the latter. 
Leaving aside this critical evaluation, let us return to the earlier 
question--the practical uses to whfch the concept of the human person as 
presented here can be put. ' The main ones suggest themselves. 
The first is that it could be used as a pattern or goal of the human 
person towards which those responsible for the education or formation of 
young people might work. The second is that it could also serve as an 
heuristic concept which could well be utilized as an analytic instrument for 
the interpretation and understanding of much of the unrest, di~satisfaction, 
longing and groping for answers that is to be found in institutional life. 
today, especially within the Church. Each of these uses merit further 
elaboration. 
First, the conciliar picture as a pattern of the human person. This 
pattern of the human person would, it seems, enter into most consideration 
of education, personal growth and development, religious formation, and 
administration: 
1) Education. The picture could be of use to parents and those 
engaged in the education of young peopie. It could serve as a 
pattern or guide for the sort of person they are trying to 
educate. 
2) Personal Development. The picture could likewise serve as a 
guide for those interested in their own development as they 
live and develop within the existing institutional structures. 
3) Religious formation. The picture is, it seems, of particular 
relevance to those responsible for the formation of religious. 
Without some such model of the human person an adequate understanding 
of a life of consecration under vows would seem very difficult to 
come by. 
4) Administration. The picture is also relevant to the administrator--
educational, religious, ecclesiastical, civil, or any other where 
human persons are concerned. This follows from the objective of 
administration wich, according to well established practice in this 
country, is making all the human and material resources of the 
organization available and effective. A moment's reflection will 
produce abundant evidence of the failure in many instances to make 
the best use of the human resources available. The "drop-outs" 
from school and the religious life, the underachievers in school 
and the "non-producers" in industry, and the thousands who live 
impoverished, stunted, soured and embittered lives as a result will 
indicate the losses entailed for the individuals themselves, for 
religious orders, for the Church, and for society at large. 
Second, the use of the picture as an heuristic concept. The unrest and 
dissatisfaction experienced in organizational life generally has been a 
subject of interest in recent years; but few have been able to bring any 
critical understanding to the phenomenon. So too with the longing, alienation, 
frustration and groping expressed in the writings and words of the more 
articulate and in the pained looks of those less so--in educational, industria , 
religious, ecclesiastical, and civil institution~! life. Much of this has 
been either misinterpreted and mis-labelled indifference, defiance, rebellion; 
or just simply misunderstood and ignored--all because of the lack of a 
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sufficiently reliable analytical instrument with which to int~rpret the 
data. To meet this need the heuristic concept (see the grid in Table 2) 
might be adapted as a guide for rendering the data intelligible and then, 
. 
as a start at least, for facilitating or procuring the suitable remedies. 
' 
, 
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APPENDIX I 
ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR VATICAN DOCUMENTS 
AA Apostolicam Actuositatem (Decree~ the Apostolate of the Laity, 1965). 
DH Dignitatis Humanae (Declaration on Religious Freedom, 1965) 
GS Gaudium et Spes (Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern 
World, 1965) 
IM Inter Mirif ica (Decree on the Instruments of Social Communication, 1963) 
LG Lumen Gentium (Dogmatic Constitution of the Church, 1964) 
OT Optatam Totius (Decree on Priestly Formation, 1965) 
.PC Perfectae Caritatis (Decree .Q!!. the Appropriate Renewal of the Religious 
Life, 1965) 
PO Presbyterorum Ordinis (Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests, 1965) 
PP Progressio Populorum (The Progress of the Peoples, 1967) 
UR Unitatis Redintegratio (Decree on Ecumenism, 1964) 
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